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Editorial
Dr. Eligar Sadeh
Dr. Sadeh is Associate Director of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
There is a strong case to be made that space is in
the national security interest, but a much weaker
case is to be made that space is in the national
economic interest. In the United States (U.S.),
national security tends to trump commercial space
concerns leading to policies and laws, like in the
area of export control, that undermine space
commercial development.
This special issue of Space and Defense is
focused on the current approach to export control
of commercial space technologies, namely the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Simply put, ITAR is obtrusive, broken, and
obsolete. ITAR has prevented international
partnerships in commercial space, or made them
exceedingly more difficult and bureaucratic to
implement. It has dramatically reduced U.S.
domestic manufacturing capabilities for vital
space-related hardware and components.
The great irony is that ITAR, in stark contrast to
its intended goal of retaining domestic
preeminence for the U.S. in the aerospace and
defense fields, is having exactly the opposite
effect. America’s leadership in commercial space
capabilities has eroded, while Russian, European,
and Asian entities have expanded and deepened
their growing dominance. The U.S. has fallen
behind in the global space commerce competition
due in no small part to its counterproductive
export control regime.
ITAR is not only harmful to commercial space,
but it also damages national security by placing
legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the U.S.
military use of commercial space assets that rely
on a robust satellite industry and space industrial
base. ITAR has led to the problem that “we are
denying our allies access to space protection
capabilities” significantly impacting how the U.S.
deals with national security space issues.

There is a need to address this export control issue
at the level of policy by reforming the “rule set”
for how ITAR is applied. The current Presidential
Directive on export control reform is a start. The
Directive calls for reducing the export licensing
time to no more than sixty days, and for
streamlining the process on how a technology is
looked at in regard to the ITAR Munitions
Control List (MCL). More congressional funding
is needed to push through the ITAR reforms
suggested by the Presidential Directive on ITAR.
The new Directive is a good step to help fix the
competitiveness
and
licensing
problems
associated with ITAR.
Further ITAR reforms are needed. This
encompasses a reassessment of what technologies
need to be controlled, and dealing with issues of
timing, review processes, transparency, and cost.
Congress needs to take on the issue by updating
export control laws to better match 21st Century
global space commerce. This starts with
reforming the current approach to ITAR by
moving jurisdiction on all dual-use commercial
space technologies from the Department of State
to the Department of Commerce, to legislating
new export control laws that update and replace
the antiquated “Cold War” legislation that is still
in place, e.g., Arms Export Control Act and
Export Administration Act.
The articles and documents published in this
special issue of Space and Defense address many
of the issues highlighted above. This includes the
historical development of the U.S. export control
regime within the context to address Cold War
foreign policy concerns, how ITAR is
implemented today, and finally, what are the
problems with ITAR implementation and how can
those problems be addressed through policy and
law.
ii
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The History of United States Weapons Export Control Policy
Taylor Dinerman
Author and Journalist, New York City

All nations regulate Arms sales, but the United
States (U.S.) has traditionally gone further than
most. After World War I, a conspiracy theory
made its way into popular culture that blamed the
war, and specifically the U.S. intervention in
1917, on the so called “merchants of death.” Ever
since, this has been a powerful and enduring
theme in politics and culture throughout the
world. Yet, nowhere have the effects of this
theory been more enduring than in U.S. policy
and law.
At the time, arms sales were seen by European
governments as tools of statecraft. Referring to
the efforts by Britain and France to sell ships to
the Baltic states, one recent study explained:
...winning the orders became
important to the economic health
of both nations, but they also
believed other benefits fell to the
power winning the bids. To the
British and the French navies,
selling warships became a means
of propping up their respective
naval industries. To the British and
French governments, and their
naval
leaders,
sales
meant
influence. And influence meant
control. And control meant more
orders. But this assumption proved
as wrong as much of British and
French thinking between the wars.1
In contrast, the U.S. refused to sell ships and
submarines to these small states both because of a
policy of not wanting to sell ships at all and due to

a fear that they “…might eventually fall into the
hands of the Bolsheviks.”2 As long as the U.S.
stayed more or less isolated from world power
politics, its decision on whether or not to export
weapons or technology mattered little, except to
the foreign states involved and to the U.S. firms
that were affected. During the interwar period,
when U.S. technology slowly began to overtake
that of Europe, especially in the aeronautical field,
these decisions became more significant.
Before World War II, export restrictions were
often informal, such as the case in 1932 when the
Army Air Corps pressured Boeing into refusing to
sell their advanced technology Model 247 airliner
to Japan. “In confidential correspondence, Boeing
officials expressly reassured the Air Corps that
none of the company’s advanced airliners would
be sold abroad unless the government approved.”3
The Neutrality Acts of the late 1930s were an
attempt to prevent the U.S. from getting
embroiled in the wars of Europe and Asia due to
arms exports. However, due to the depression,
few in the U.S. Congress wanted to cut all
weapons exports off entirely. So, the U.S.
continued to export weapons to a few selected
belligerent nations such as Nationalist China,
while denying them to others, such as Ethiopia or
Spain.
From the beginning of World War II in September
1939 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in
December 1941, the Roosevelt Administration
faced numerous legal and political obstacles in its
efforts to aid first Great Britain and later the
2
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Occasionally, the administration flat out broke the
law as when it delivered half a million surplus
rifles to the British in the early summer of 1940.

much reason for thinking so. Take
one simple test, the ability to
withstand nationalism. It is often
said that science is international,
but in practice the scientific
workers of all countries tend to line
up behind their own governments
with fewer scruples than are felt by
the writers and artists. The German
scientific community, as a whole,
made no resistance to Hitler. Hitler
may have ruined the long-term
prospects of German science, but
there were still plenty of gifted
men to do the necessary research
on such things as synthetic oil, jet
planes, rocket projectiles, and the
atomic bomb. Without them the
German war machine could never
have been built up.5

Driven by sympathy with China and by Japan’s
aggressive overall policy, the Roosevelt
Administration began to increase pressure on
Japan in 1938. While this policy failed to deter
Japan from attacking Pearl Harbor, it did serve to
weaken the Imperial War machine. The State
Department began with what was termed a “Moral
Embargo.” On July 1, 1938, Charles W. Yost,
chief of the Department’s Office of Arms and
Munitions Control, notified the 148 U.S. aircraft
manufactures and exporters who had registered
with his office that only with “great regret” would
he issue export licenses for warplanes and their
munitions without naming Japan specifically.”4
The policy evolved into full scale economic
warfare culminating in the dollar freeze of July
1941, which effectively cut Japan off from
purchases of oil and other essential commodities.
It is important to note that much of the impetus
for this policy came from relatively low level
diplomats and military men, such as Assistant
Secretary of State Dean Acheson. These men
were ready to punish Japan much harder then their
superiors wanted to.
During the war, ideas about the role of science
both in the war itself and in the post war era were
an important part of the intellectual discourse. On
the left, it was often assumed that science would
automatically make the world a more socialist
place. Others such as George Orwell had their
doubts. Writing in October 1945, more than a
month after the Japanese surrender, he asked:
But is it really true that a scientist,
...is any likelier than other people
to approach nonscientific problems
in an objective way? There is not
4
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After 1945, U.S. leaders were led to assume that it
would take the USSR at least ten years or more to
develop their first atomic weapon “Truman and
his advisors knew that sooner or later the Russians
would develop their own bomb, but they were all
surprised at how
The policy soon it actually
6
evolved into full - came.” This was
the first of many
scale economic intelligence failures
warfare involving nuclear
weapons. In fact,
the Soviet regime gave the development of these
weapons the highest priority, their program also
benefited from an excellent espionage network in
the U.S., Canada, and the United Kingdom (UK)
as well as from several home grown men of
genius, notably Andrei Sakharov. The U.S.
reaction to the first successful Soviet nuclear
weapons test in 1949 and the subsequent war in
Korea, where the U.S. was surprised by the
5
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excellent performance of the MIG-15 fighter and
its British-designed engine was to try and insure
that such leaks did not happen again. Stalin was
skeptical that Britain would sell these engines–
“What kind of a fool would be willing to sell his
secrets!” he had reportedly said.”7
The late 1940s and early 1950s were the heydays
of large-scale managerial research. Norbert
Wiener wrote that “I consider that the leaders of
the present trend from individualistic research to
controlled industrial research are dominated, or at
least seriously touched by, distrust in the
individual that amounts to distrust in the human.”8
This environment, which engendered more
secrecy than the previous generation of academic
scientists, became a subject of controversy. Much
of this was caused by political, or specifically left
wing, concerns rather than any real desire to
promote the free circulation of ideas. The battles
between Robert Oppenheimer with his
conventionally leftist sympathies and Edward
Teller whose anti-Communism and unabashed
patriotism, based in part on his immigrant
experience, was mirrored by debates over how
much to trust the Soviet Union. As one
protagonist put it:
“As President Reagan never tired
of saying, ‘nations do not develop
mistrust because of arms. Rather,
they develop arms because of
mistrust’. Western mistrust has
been based on the Soviets’ seventy
year record of repression within
and
aggression
beyond
its
9
borders”
These debates continued to one degree or another
until the end of the Cold War. One example was
the 1948 controversy surrounding Edward

Condon who had been director of the National
Bureau of Standards and was accused of having
ties to the American Soviet Science Society.
While the publicly available evidence against
Condon was never released, Vannevar Bush made
clear that he had showed a “lack of proper care in
the types of remarks he has made and the type of
associates he has sometimes had.”10
The U.S. not only lacked the skills needed to
effectively locate and neutralize, in a timely
fashion, Soviet spy networks, but it was also
helpless in the face of a world wide propaganda
campaign that was aimed at “McCarthyism.” Of
course, there were legal abuses in the 1940s and
1950s, but the Soviet goal was not to protect U.S.
Civil Liberties, but to make life as hard as
possible for America’s counterintelligence
operations. It also became a powerful political
issue that helped discredit and drive apart liberals
and conservatives.
In the same period, the U.S. was providing Europe
with reconstruction aid under the Marshall Plan
and with military aid as well. At the same time,
European states did not want to give up their trade
relations with the states on the other side of the
Iron Curtain. The danger for them was that
Americans, who were engaged in a global cold
war and had little patience with those who
accepted U.S. aid and protection while flirting
with the enemy, would react in a negative fashion.
Europeans and Americans needed a way to make
certain that U.S. political support for the Marshall
Plan and for Europe’s security remained intact.
“The conservatives claimed that Marshall Aid,
taken together with other commitments, exceeded
the limits of American resources and discouraged
Europeans from putting their own house in
order.”11 The Coordinating Committee for

7

David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (Yale
University Press, New Haven, CT, 1994).
8
Norbert Weiner, Invention, The care and feeding
of ideas (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993).
9
Kenneth Adelman, The Great Universal
Embrace Arms Summitry, A Skeptics Account
(Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1989).

10

G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier Vannevar
Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Free
Press, New York, NY, 1997).
11
Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan America,
Britain and the reconstruction of Western Europe
3

Dinerman, The History of United States Weapons Export Control Policy

Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was
established in 1949; the U.S., UK, and France and
the Benelux states were the first members.
Norway, Denmark, Canada, and West Germany
joined in 1950, with Portugal and Japan joining in
1953, and Australia in 1989. CoCom was never a
formal organization. It is often described as
nothing more than a Gentleman’s Agreement, yet
it was one of the most effective tools of U.S.
economic diplomacy throughout the Cold War.
“Confidentiality was a necessary part of the early
Cold War compromise that created CoCom; for
several west European states, participation in a
system of economic discrimination targeted
against communist states was of dubious legality
and potentially explosive politically.”12 Europe
and Japan were concerned about the restrictions
that CoCom put on their trade, and the U.S., while
often inconsistent and arbitrary, kept up the
pressure for more and more restrictions.
U.S.
economic
warfare against the
USSR and vice-versa
was a fact of the Cold
War. At some times,
U.S.-USSR politics,
such
as
détente,
placed inhibitions on
the effort, but the economic warfare never fully
stopped and was ready to be activated when
political circumstances changed. One key turning
point was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979. The economic pressure put on
the USSR in the 1980s by the Reagan
Administration was not simply confined to export
controls, but included a wide variety of actions,
including urging the Saudis to ramp up oil
production to drive down the price. This savaged
the Soviet’s main source of hard currency income
and pushed the price of their operations in Africa,
Latin America, and Asia up to unsustainable

It was the
Soviet system
itself that failed
to keep up with
its foes

1947-1952
(Cambridge
University
Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1989).
12
Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment,
CoCom and the Politics of East West Trade
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1992).

levels. In his memoirs, Reagan wrote that in the
early days of his Administration “It seemed clear
to me that in time Communism would collapse of
its own weight, and I wondered how we as a
nation could use these cracks in the Soviet system
to accelerate the process of collapse.”13
Export controls, even though they were a source
of U.S.-European friction, made life extremely
difficult for the Soviets. The U.S. effort changed
the trading environment, and instead of being
offered credits at below market rates and price
discounts on their purchases, the Soviets had to
pay premiums to middlemen working through
intelligence organizations to buy essential modern
industrial equipment. A 1982 U.S. government
report said that: “The overwhelming majority of
what the United States considers militarily
significant technology acquired by and for the
Soviets was obtained by the Soviet intelligence
services and the East European intelligence
services.”14
Having to work through intelligence services not
only made the technology acquisition process
expensive and vulnerable, but it also slowed it
down at the very moment when computer
technology development was accelerating in the
West, particularly in America. It was the Soviet
system itself that failed to keep up with its foes.
One former senior U.S. intelligence officer
expressed that:
…the computer’s power is useless
unless the data it processes is
accurate. And this means that any
political or economic system which
wishes to stay abreast of the surge
in technology must give millions of
people access to a broad range of
accurate data. Any system based
heavily on state control of
13

Ronald Reagan, An American Life (Simon and
Schuster, New York, NY, 1990).
14
Douglas McDaniel, United States Technology
Export Control, An Assessment (Praeger,
Westport, CT, 1993).
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information or that permits its
bureaucracy to provide skewed
data must reform itself or slip
backwards technologically and
economically.15
The more difficult the U.S. and its allies made it
for the USSR to buy technology in the West, the
more they had to depend on their own flawed
system. This lead to such things as the well
known “exploding television” phenomena and
often to integrated weapon systems that failed to
defeat Western ones. This was particularly evident
during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967, 1973, and
1982. For example, Syria’s Russian-supplied air
defense system, and a good part of its air force,
was wiped out by Israel during the1982 Israeli
war in Lebanon.
On June 9th, during a major attack on the SA-6
batteries, the technological competition between
East and West, in a clash of investments valued at
billions of dollars, ended with a conclusive
victory by the West. At least twenty-two Soviet
MIGs, of both models, were shot down, (in
addition to seven others that had been downed
since that morning), constituting between onequarter and one-third of the Syrian force. Not a
single Israeli aircraft was downed.16
For the U.S., the interest to open new markets in
the late 1980s and early 1990s was strong. The
U.S. trade deficit was always a problem, but it
was the politics of the time that ended up
determining the fate of U.S. export controls. At
the time, the center-left opposition in America
was, naturally, looking for themes that could be
used to discredit the Reagan and Bush
Administrations. The trade deficit was a good one,
combined with the ease with which they could
generate a fear that the world was going to be
15

Daniel O. Graham, Confessions of a Cold
Warrior (Preview Press, Fairfax VA, 1995).
16
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New York, NY, 1993).

taken over by export oriented “neo- mercantilist”
powers such as Japan and West Germany.
This theme, reiterated in articles, studies with
titles like “Japan as Number One”, and novels and
movies, lead to a mild form of paranoia vis-à-vis
Japan and a feeling that America’s computer
industry needed to be supported the same way that
Japan or other Asian nations supported theirs. “At
the growth rate of 1963-73, Japan would overtake
the United States in real per capita income by
1985, and total Japanese output would exceed that
of the United States by 1998.”17 This fear
combined with the cultural affinity that many
industry leaders had with leading Democrats
made the whole question of export controls an
important issue in the 1992 election.
When it comes to strategic sales, politics is never
far away. In 1975, there were the Lockheed
bribery scandals coming on top of Watergate.
This was followed by the congressional
investigations into the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). It was then revealed that contracts
to some foreign countries were designed to have,
as a part of their price, a series of payments to
consultants who had helped to facilitate the deal.
These consultants, in turn, allegedly paid bribes to
people in positions of responsibility. Among the
more notorious of those who were alleged to have
received the bribes were Japan’s Yoshio Kodama
and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands.18
These revelations lead to the enactment of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (CPRA), which put
the U.S. in the forefront of the international
struggle against corruption, even though this was
to handicap the U.S. economically over the years.
“As a practical matter, the U.S. remains virtually
the only country that vigorously prosecutes its

17
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companies for bribing foreign officials.”19
Nevertheless, this law has become in part, the
model for international anti-corruption legislation.
American pressure on its trading partners was
partly responsible for this as was pressure from
international civil society including nongovernmental organizations and the media.
In 1992, the CPRA was perceived as a U.S.
government obstacle to America’s need to export.
The idea that the U.S. should suppress imports by
means of taxes on consumers and should promote
its exports “by any means necessary” gained
ground. What was odd about this was that those
who promoted this in the name of “industrial
policy” saw it as aimed against military allies, in
particular against Germany and Japan, and they
saw America’s foes such as the USSR as being
nothing more than targets for a new export drive.
Between 1989 and 1993, much of the focus of
U.S. economic sanctions activity had switched
from the Soviet Union, which ceased to exist in
December 1991, to China,
whose 1989 Tiananmen …China tried
Square “crackdown” caused
the U.S. and other Western hard to
nations to cut-off weapons develop a
exports and to restrict privileged
China’s access to sensitive
technology. China, however, position for
was not the USSR, the itself
economic reforms of the
Deng era had profoundly
changed its economy, which
became in many ways a conventionally
mercantilist one on the Asian model, while still
remaining politically a one-party Communist
state. From a U.S. standpoint, China does not
believe in supporting a universal Communist
revolution and has pursued a strategy that is closer
to that of pre-1914 Germany than to anything that
ever came out of the Soviet politburo.

Complicating relations was the heritage of the
U.S. quasi-alliance with China aimed at the
USSR. American support for China in the 1970s
and 1980, had rarely involved arms sales, a few
helicopters and other items. The U.S. had
encouraged others, notably in Europe and in
Israel, to help to update the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), whose forces had not received any
serious injections of new technology since the
Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.
In his memoir, President Reagan’s Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman, wrote that “the most
functionally important was the fourth and final
agreement to undertake a program to modernize
Chinese destroyers and frigates with modern
technology, enabling them to carry out effective
antisubmarine warfare.”20 While the U.S. had to
be careful not to overtly state that the relationship
was aimed at the USSR, this was in fact the case.
There was also the pull of the Chinese market;
American businessmen have been trying to
develop a Chinese customer base since the late
18th century. China meanwhile has centuries of
experience in exploiting foreigners for their own
purposes. The Chinese from necessity had made
manipulation of the strong by the weak into a fine
art.”21
It should be recognized that neither Americans
nor Chinese have a very good record of being able
to achieve their national goals through trade. In
the 1960s, China tried hard to develop a
privileged position for itself in the newly
independent states of Africa through a
combination of trade, aid, and military assistance.
For the most part, this failed since most African
states preferred to trade with the West and to
obtain their weapons from the USSR. China’s
relatively successful mercantilist export policy
combined with its technological espionage effort,
gives it advantages that the USSR never had.
20
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These include: unimpeded access to the capitalist
world’s banking system; and to the higher
education establishments of the U.S. and to a
lesser extent, Europe.
For the U.S., trying to contain China’s military
growth and at the same time to integrate it into the
world community is a tough balancing act.
Unfortunately, politics tends to undermine any
attempt to build a sensible and balanced long term
strategy. This problem has lead directly to the
current situation. America’s current export control
system is the direct result of politics. The Clinton
Administration abolished the CoCom in late 1993
as a relic of the Cold War.22 Concomitantly, many
of the export control functions that had been
handled by the State Department and by the
Department of Defense (DOD) were transferred to
the Commerce Department. Commerce strived for
mercantilist trade promotion, limited only by the
Constitution and by the structure of the American
economy. This policy led to high-technology trade
with China that involved the launching of U.S.
commercial satellites on the Chinese Long March
rocket.
The Chinese Long March failures between 1992
and 1996 and the U.S. made communications
satellite they were carrying were compromised.
Loral and Hughes assisted with the accident
investigations and in the process leaked valuable
technological information that supposedly helped
China to improve the performance of its ballistic
missiles.23 A Pentagon report quoted by one critic
of the U.S. trade policy towards China said:
22

Under CoCom rules, the West experienced the
greatest period of prosperity and economic growth
in the history of the human race. The new set of
international export rules that replaced CoCom,
the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls
for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies, is more loosely organized with
more limited institutional structures.
23
Eligar Sadeh, “Bureaucratic Politics Run Amok:
The United States and Satellite Export Controls,”
in this issue of the journal.

The provision of technical
assistance in connection with the
failure investigation to the Chinese
by Hughes in the design,
engineering, and operation of the
Chinese launch vehicle and the
Hughes satellite constitutes a
“defense service” within the
meaning of the State Department’s
International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) under the
Arms
Export
Control
Act
(AECA).24
Combined with revelation of Chinese espionage
aimed at U.S. nuclear weapons labs this set off a
political firestorm. In March 1999, a
congressional investigative panel was about to
announce China’s theft of information on nearly
every U.S. nuclear weapons design, due in part to
the incompetence of the Clinton administration
Justice Department.25
In the end, the Congressional investigation was
inconclusive. Congress did, however, find
evidence of a very large Chinese espionage
program aimed at U.S. military and technological
secrets.26 In order to counter this program, they
recommended strengthening the U.S. export
control regime. “In addition the panel called for
stricter Defense Department controls on satellite
24
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25
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26
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such an improvement in the nuclear weapons that
could be aimed at the U.S. homeland required
some sort of response from the U.S. Congress.
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launches in China.”27 In a divided government,
there are limits on what the legislative branch can
do to force a President of a different party to do its
will. In the absence of any possible effective
cooperation from the Administration, the
Republican majority in Congress ordered in 1999
that communications satellites and all their
components be placed on the munitions control
list and thus, fall under ITAR regulations. This
was a blow to U.S. policy that sought to promote
U.S. exports with fewer national security
limitations. The Commerce Department would no
longer be able to issue export licenses for
commercial satellites and their components. The
impact of this change was both far reaching and
unexpected.

ITAR, as currently practiced, is a form of
economic warfare practiced by the U.S. to try and
achieve broad national security interests.
“Evidence is beginning to emerge that it harms
the sector and undercuts and erodes our economic
competitiveness and forces international partners
to go it alone.”30 Even though the domestic
satellite industry and its component suppliers have
been hurt, the U.S. will not give up the use of
sanctions and other forms of economic pressure.
They are an essential part of American statecraft,
even if they are often used in crude ways and lead
to
outcomes
that
are
increasingly
counterproductive.

Over the last eight years, the ITAR regulations
have done serious damage not only to U.S. efforts
to sell commercial satellites, but also to NASA’s
science and human spaceflight programs. “They
have also proven a wonderful stimulator of
international
cooperation
without
U.S.
participation.”28 This damage is due to the way the
U.S. government works. The State Department’s
enforcement of ITAR regulations is a good
example. The delays in processing space-related
ITAR paperwork was due to a lack of trained
personnel, and the people needed to deal with the
paperwork were not engineers or people with a
military background who could recognize when a
certain bit of technology was dangerous and when
it could be exported. These were lawyers who, by
the nature of their training, would impartially and
blindly enforce the law, no matter how much
damage they were doing to the nation. “Scott Pace
noted that U.S. ITAR regulations were an inartful
response to globalization that created the risk of
losing satellite manufacturing capability and
influence.”29
27
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28
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29
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The American Bubble:
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Space Commerce
Professor Roger Handberg
Department of Political Science, University of Central Florida

International space commerce in the United States
(U.S.) has entered into a period of great
uncertainty regarding its current and future
competitiveness and marketability of its products.
This question arises because the U.S. with regard
to space commerce remains frozen in a posture
established first during the Cold War. The
concern then was that no critical technologies be
made available to U.S. enemies and their fellow
travelers. The former were obvious while the
latter were more problematic since that group also
included states with which the U.S. wished to
establish more positive relations including
international trade. The mechanism used to
monitor and control that trade process is the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
regime applied by the U.S. Department of State.
The issue is whether ITAR is still of the same
value in a post-Cold War world and whether their
enforcement might take a different approach. As
will be discussed, changes in their application
began especially toward the Cold War’s end, but
those changes were largely reversed due to a
combination of domestic politics and international
uncertainty. The question is whether the ITAR as
presently implemented meets the strategic
interests of the U.S. or is their unintended effect
one of undermining the U.S. ability to influence
international trade with regard to space
technologies. For other categories related to arms,
the ITAR supports U.S. policy objectives even
though their application is often characterized by
excessive slowness and rigidity in application.
ITAR and the Cold War
In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. along
with other states constructed a number of

international and national institutions aimed at
fostering international trade and economic
growth. The Bretton Woods meeting during
World War II led to agreements in 1944
establishing a system of international financial
institutions to govern monetary policy among
states. U.S. national interests led to this effort,
building strong trading partners and allies in the
post-war world. However, subsequent political
events in Europe and Asia raised concerns about
the future, the Cold War. The Cold War was a
global military-economic-ideological competition
between the U.S. and its allies, and the Soviet
Union and those states aligned with it. In this
context, a third collection of states emerged who
professed nonalignment with either antagonist; a
group that grew in numbers with the
dismemberment of the colonial empires.
Trade between the U.S. and the Soviet block
countries also incorporating the People’s Republic
of China was at best minimal and usually virtually
nil. For these other states that were not U.S. allies,
the U.S. established trade relations based on
demand for their products. That meant that most
underdeveloped states had very limited trade with
the U.S. except for extractive industries. Cold
War competition often brought the U.S. and the
Soviets into direct political competition - a
competition in which trade relations became an
important foreign policy tool. The argument made
was that expanding trade with a nonaligned state
would incline its leadership to favor the U.S. in
other matters. The difficulty was that in many
instances, the products desired by the
underdeveloped state were such that they might
have military value and could be forwarded on to
U.S. adversaries. Such items included various
electronic goods and services. The U.S. for
9
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reasons of national security and protection of its
existing trade advantage wished to monitor and
control these items sales and their future export.
Allies were considered less of a problem, but
there was the possibility that corrupted officials
could facilitate export of otherwise forbidden
items. The U.S. wanted to ensure that the
prohibitions were enforced so recipients of
otherwise controlled items would be on notice that
forwarding those items to states otherwise
forbidden would have consequences, no further
exports to the offending state and criminal
penalties for individuals violating the law.
The mechanism used during the Cold War was the
Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
Controls (CoCom). Technology transfer questions
were resolved through this process, which later
was incorporated into the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976. This Act identifies those items that
should be regulated because they are deemed
defense articles and defense services. The result is
the ITAR licensing process through the Munitions
Control List (MCL) of space technologies that are
explicitly covered under the Missile Technology
Control Regime. MCL became the mechanism
through which trade can be controlled and
channeled. Evaluation of proposed sales was
handled by the U.S. Department of State with
significant input from the Department of Defense
(DOD). This combination of reviewers, it was
confidently expected, would provide the strongest
control over leakage of military secrets since both
departments define themselves as protectors of
U.S. national interests as an institutional priority.
What was more intrusive is the requirement that
government monitors had to authorize and often
attend any meeting where technical information
was to be exchanged.
The task before the regulators grew more
complicated over time as dual use technologies
became more prevalent. For example, computer
technologies from their onset had clear military
applications. As the commercial sector grew and
information
technology
became
more
sophisticated, the commercial versions were often
more powerful than the military ones, capable of
ever more powerful operations. Their value to

potential adversaries became more apparent with
the implication that their dissemination needed to
be monitored and regulated to prevent hostile
parties gaining access. However, political realities
were such that information technologies were
more easily exported with few exceptions than
space technologies. This reflected in part the
reality that U.S. computer and chip makers were
competing in a global market where their success
was not guaranteed. Space technologies in the
West were dominated by the U.S. until the 1980s
and early 1990s as the Europeans first followed
by the Japanese at a distance became strong
competitors. As that occurred, rules became
looser.
In the early days of ITAR, friend or foe in
principle was comparatively easy to determine.
Over time the picture grew more complicated in
that many states were friendly with the Soviets
and Chinese. That included North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) members such as Great
Britain who for example had diplomatic and trade
relations with mainland China while the U.S.
recognized
the
information Republic of China
technologies (Taiwan) as the
legitimate
were more government. All this
easily exported made applying ITAR
complicated
than space more
since the evaluation
technologies becomes
once
removed.
Clear
language was placed in the regulations to prohibit
transfer of certain exports to third parties, closing
a backdoor method of technology acquisition. In
principle, the loophole was closed, but clearly was
not air-tight. Enforcement of indirect regulations
remained an issue, but the disincentive for the
foreign partners was that U.S. technology
products were valued so that access to them was
strongly preferred even if that mean enforcing
U.S. rules seen as onerous: that was the price of
access.
Until the 1980s, ITAR met its purpose of denying
militarily useful technologies from U.S.
adversaries and their allies. Any hindering of U.S.
10
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trade was accepted as a necessary price to sustain
national defense. Complaints arose in academic
circles, but were generally discounted although a
few exceptions were carved out to accommodate
them, especially those doing scientific work
employing spacecraft of differing types. Those
objections by the academic community were met
by Presidential National Security Decision
Directive 189 dated 21 September 1985, that
exempted fundamental scientific research from
ITAR and MCL regulations.1 This exception was
reaffirmed by the Bush administration on 21
November 2001.2 Earlier, in the Reagan
Administration in 1984, U.S. satellites could be
launched by international companies, explicitly
Arianespace at their French Guiana launch
faculty. Gradually, application of the prohibitions
lessened in their strictures as the Cold War waxed
and waned in intensity. Less advanced products
including older computer types were sold to states
formerly prohibited. This occurred in response to
the rise of economic competitors to the U.S.
among its allies; primarily Europe and Japan.
Their perspective was more purely trade oriented
demonstrated by their willingness to sell products
to states that the U.S. would not. These products
were not controllable by the U.S. since they had
developed independently. The actual degree of
independence is unclear given the increasing
internationalization of many areas of science and
technology. In fact, in the late 1980s, the U.S. was
lagging in certain technology areas, especially
computer-based technologies. So, any U.S. trade
restrictions were receding in importance given
these alternative sources.

1
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Santa Clara Journal of International Law 2
(2003).
2
Julie T. Norris, Restrictions on Research Awards,
Troublesome Clauses. A Report of the
AAU/COGR Taskforce. Washington: Association
of
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2004,
http://www.aau.edu/research/Rpt4.8.04.pdf (accessed 6
September 2007).

Cracks Within the “ITAR Wall”
Given that national security drove the
development and implementation of ITAR,
changes in that environment could impact their
application. Over time, the resurrection of Europe
and Japan as major economic agents subtlety
changed their role. The U.S. found that its
strictures against export of various technologies
were increasingly ignored. By the late Reagan
administration, the general issue of how to treat
such exports to formerly embargoed states had
risen to levels within the U.S. government that a
presidential decision was required. President
Reagan agreed to the possibility of using Chinese
or Soviet launch vehicles. This debate took place
within a context in which the U.S. and the Soviet
Union and China were moving toward more
normal relations including economics. This
included the possibility that their lift vehicles
could be used to launch U.S. built communication
satellites (COMSATs) into orbit. This presented
an interesting situation since the U.S. was by far
the dominant builder of communications
satellites– a status the U.S. had aggressively
defended for years.3
Using other states’ launch vehicles was a major
gesture toward globalizing the world economy.
On the other hand, this willingness to reconsider
the question reflected a perception that in the
aftermath of the January 1986 Space Shuttle
Challenger accident, the U.S. launch industry had
fallen behind its international competitors.4 The
debate whether to lessen ITAR to accommodate
proved an extremely contentious debate. The
debate was between what could roughly be
described as the controllers and those interested in
expanded world trade. The controllers were those
who argued that national security should trump
any trade considerations regardless of temporary
lessening of tensions. The risks of transferring
3
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4
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militarily relevant technologies to potential
adversaries were still considered too great.
Expanded trade supporters argued that the U.S.
benefited from the opening up of this area of
economic activity. That expanded economic ties
would help ameliorate long term antagonisms and
foster closer cooperative ties, a win-win situation.
The risks of any inadvertent technology transfers
could be mitigated by establishing certain
procedures limiting what was made known to the
launch operator. Clearly, some tech transfer
would occur simply because U.S. companies
would have to insure that Soviet or Chinese
launch operations could properly handle the
payloads.
The then President Bush authorized the licenses to
be issued as the trade advocates successfully
argued that normalized trade relations were in the
national interest. Licenses to export were
authorized, but protective measures were taken.5
The payloads traveled in sealed containers with
U.S. security personnel constantly present to stop
any attempts to examine the satellites. Sufficient
information was provided to allow the satellite to
be properly mounted for release once orbit is
achieved. The understanding was that whatever
information was released would not materially
assist the Chinese or Russians.
An integral part of
the controversy was Chinese Long
the growing schism March boosters
between the satellite
were thought less
builders and the
launch companies. reliable, and
The latter were thus less of a
under intense stress
competitive threat
as the Europeans
with the Ariane 4
lifters were dominating the launch markets. The
Chinese and Russians added even more
competition since until the security restrictions
were lifted in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their
5

Eric Choi and Sorin Niculescu, “The Impact of
US Export Controls on the Canadian Space
Industry,” Space Policy 22 (2006).

launchers were excluded from carrying U.S.
payloads. The split also came over the question of
costs – U.S. launchers were legacy carriers from
earlier generation converted missiles and more
expensive than their international competitors.
Opening the doors to new launch vendors did not
totally eliminate U.S. launch providers’
advantages since U.S. government payloads were
still only flown on U.S. flag carriers. The new
competitors also benefited from cost differentials
between western prices and the artificial price
structures of authoritarian states. The collapse of
the Soviet Union further expanded this price gap
when the Russian economy effectively went into
free fall.
U.S. launch providers may have lost the fight over
entry of new competitors into the field, but other
restrictions were imposed. Given the artificial
pricing structures inherent in socialist political
systems, the U.S. demanded that quotas be
imposed on each– without such a quota, American
COMSATs would be available as payloads. Since
U.S. COMSAT payloads constituted ninety
percent of those available worldwide, failure to
agree to these quotas meant “de facto” no market
because Arianespace handled most European
payloads, the balance of the available payloads.
The quotas differed with the Soviets-Russians
being the most intense since their lifters were seen
as the most reliable and competitive. Given the
mystery associated with the Chinese space
program, Chinese Long March boosters were
thought less reliable, and thus less of a
competitive threat. Both quotas were for a
specified time period. In fact, neither competitor
used up its quota with the collapse of the
COMSAT boom in the 1990s, the quotas were not
renewed.6
Ironically, the schism between the satellite
builders and the launch providers faded as
mergers ended with Boeing and Lockheed Martin
as the major vertically integrated players. Through
their mergers and launch alliances, the two
dominated American space industry. Their
international alliances, Sea Launch (Boeing) and
6
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International Launch Services (Lockheed Martin)
tied various former Soviet launch providers into
American space industry.7 Competition was not
eliminated as Arianespace remained the industry
leader, but was severely constrained. Over time,
the Chinese through aggressive marketing and
price competition became major players in
launching U.S. satellites to orbit. This can be seen
in their incorporation into the Iridium launches,
sixty-six satellites plus six spares. All the major
launch competitors were involved.
Walls Fall, But Are Rebuilt
With the arrival of the Clinton administration in
office in January 1993, licensing under ITAR was
eventually moved to the U.S. Department of
Commerce in 1996. Earlier in October 1992, a
subset of COMSAT technologies had been moved
from the Department of State to the Department
of Commerce for licensing purposes. This was in
line with both administrations’ desire to foster
trade relations in the aftermath of the Soviet
Union’s collapse. The goal was engaging the
world through strong economic linkages,
especially former socialist states including Russia
and China. Given the Department of Commerce’s
mandate toward expanding trade, the obvious
outcome was a general loosening of ITAR
restrictions.8 These moves were not universally
greeted with acclaim by the controllers who felt
the U.S. was giving away the store while
incurring great risks to national security. Their
concerns were shared by many Republican
conservatives whose views of the former Soviet
Union and China were much more negative than
was official policy. The situation was ironic in
that the skeptics were among those who usually
strongly supported business interests of which
trade was a major component.
7

Andrew J. Aldrin, “Technology Control Regimes
and the Globalization of Space Industry,” Space
Policy 14 (1998).
8
This was heightened by the presence of Ron
Brown, a close personal associate of President
Clinton as Secretary of Commerce, whose
primary mission was growing U.S. trade with
other states.

Reversal came disguised in the shape of launch
accidents in which Chinese Long March vehicles
failed during lift off. American COMSAT
payloads were total losses. In addition, lives were
lost in the villages just outside the spaceport; the
exact total was never officially announced
although twenty seven was the number given for
one accident. As is customary with such flight
failures, a post accident investigation was
launched. For the Chinese, conducting this
investigation successfully, meaning finding a
cause for the accident that could be corrected, was
absolutely essential. An incomplete or otherwise
distorted investigation would fail to satisfy the
insurance investigators, meaning Long March
vehicles became uninsurable. No insurance meant
any possible western payloads became
unavailable. Government payloads are effectively
self insured while commercial payloads owners
normally purchase insurance on the open market.
Flight failures raise future insurance rates or make
the vehicle uninsurable.9
The
subsequent
investigation
included
participation from all involved parties, meaning
primarily the Chinese government as operators of
the launch vehicle and the payload owners,
meaning the satellite builders. Most satellite
contracts give up control over the satellite after its
safe arrival and check out on orbit to insure proper
operations before the customer assumes control.
Hughes Aerospace was the COMSAT builder and
participated in the investigation – Boeing later
bought Hughes and assumed its role in the joint
investigation and its aftermath. Given the
economic stakes, the investigation had to be
thorough, which meant delving into technical
aspects which raised flags among skeptics of trade
with China. In the resulting process, technical
information beyond that already made available
was exchanged in part because the Chinese
initially claimed the accident had been possibly
caused by some defect with the payload itself. In
order to refute this possibility, technical
information was exchanged in greater detail. The
resulting investigation indicated that launch
vehicle operations were the cause.
9
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However, as knowledge of the investigation and
the extent of the technical information exchange
became known, a drumbeat of criticism arose in
the U.S. Congress fueled by the growing
perception of China as a future military rival akin
to the old Soviet Union. The argument was that
the Chinese, in launching U.S. COMSATs, were
obtaining knowledge that helped upgrade their
missile capabilities.10 In addition, Republican
politicians’ animosity toward President Clinton
added to the intensity of the debate. The debate
grew larger into a charge that Chinese industrialmilitary espionage was penetrating the trade
process and U.S. national weapons labs. In fact, a
scientist, Wen Ho Lee, at Los Alamos National
Laboratory of Chinese heritage was accused of
nuclear espionage; the charges were ultimately
dismissed. The political storm over China and its
efforts to gain American secrets waxed in
intensity.
The U.S. House of Representatives established an
investigatory commission to examine the entire
question of Chinese spying. The Cox Commission
report completed in 1998, but not made public
until 1999, became the basis for congressional
action.11 An amendment was added to the 1999
DOD authorization act ending the Department of
Commerce’s primary role in ITAR licensing. The
Department of State was returned to its previous
position as licensing agency with major input
from the DOD. This change was aimed at
increasing national security scrutiny of any
license requests. There were no directions to stop
or severely reduce trade with China specifically or
any other state. However, the greatly heightened
political sensitivity of license requests to export to
China was obvious– a fact the bureaucracy was
fully aware of and prepared to act on immediately.
10
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11
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United States Space Commerce in the Bubble
Changing the approver meant at least a more
restrictive or cautious view of export applications
of space technologies to China regardless of any
precautions taken. The crunch came almost
immediately with an export license for a Chinese
COMSAT built by Hughes was put on indefinite
hold. That particular license had too many
political negatives to allow immediate approval.
In fact, the parties eventually gave up and the
COMSAT was sold elsewhere. Symbolically, the
political point was made almost immediately even
though implementation of the new process proved
more complicated than expected.12
In addition, the Department of State encountered
issues regarding its personnel and their
competence and
uncertainty as to …the Chinese
what
was …were obtaining
politically
acceptable. State knowledge that
lacked sufficient helped upgrade
trained
their missile
personnel able
to process the capabilities
license
applications. Hiring and training staff represented
a major challenge, which was only slowly
overcome given federal hiring procedures. What
proved more unsettling was the narrow view by
the license examiners. The political sensitivity of
the question heightened their caution with rules
being interpreted in the closest manner possible.
The result was a classic example of unintended
consequences.13
As indicated above, high-technology exports to
China were immediately quashed generally with
any exceptions carefully vetted. Other results of
the change were more unsettling. First, there was
a dramatic slowdown in the time necessary to gain
approval.14 For U.S. space industry, this delay
12
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generally hurt their ability to compete globally.
Each exchange of technical information or
meeting to discuss such information with
international personnel had to be sanctioned in
advance
through
Technical
Assistance
Agreements, imposing significant disruptions
upon normal business operations. These
procedures made U.S. space technologies less
competitive or not competitive as other states,
such as the Europeans, aggressively moved in to
fill the void. U.S. space technologies could now
be replaced without degradation in performance,
something not true earlier.
Second, Great Britain, Canada, and NATO allies
were placed under the same degree of scrutiny as
China – the original impetus for the change.
Beyond embarrassment, the treatment of class
allies as adversaries put a temporary crimp in U.S.
high-technology trade with them, a restriction that
was quickly lifted but the political and trade
damage was done.15 Given the perceived erratic
nature of the ITAR process, at least one European
space company removed any U.S. content from its
products – removing U.S. ability to compete with
other suppliers for that company’s COMSATs.16
Other manufacturers of space technologies began
to reduce the amount of American content in their
products as a way to reduce U.S. interference in
their ability to sell to whomever they wished. In
fact, the European Space Agency advertises on its
website regarding an “ITAR-free SpaceBus
4000B2.”17
Third, efforts by space industry to reverse this
negative outcome by reusing the statute fell on
deaf ears in Congress. Why these efforts failed is
a mix of motives including reaction to events after
Controls,” Pacific Telecommunications Review
(August 1999), web.ptc.org/library/ptr/3q99/
freese.html (accessed 15 August 2005).
15
Peter de Selding, "Satellite Buyers Blast US
Rules," Space News (5 April 1999).
16
Antonella Bini, “Export Control of Space Items:
Preserving Europe’s Advantage,” Space Policy 23
(2007).
17
SeeThales-Alena, telecom.esa.int/telecom/www/
object/index.cfm?fobjectid=28086 (accessed 15
September 2007).

September 11, 2001 and heightened concerns
about a resurgent Russia and surging China. The
latter raised fears of possible future military
confrontations in which space technologies would
be major assets in the event of war.
Administration policy emphasized a go it alone
approach to many world issues– an approach that
required the U.S. be dominant. Loss of its
technological edge would leave the U.S. exposed
to its enemies. Weakening the ITAR regime was
seen as counterproductive to long term security
interests.
Ironically, ITAR from its initiation was premised
on a world in which U.S. space technologies were
the cutting edge. Successive presidential
administrations worked to sustain that edge,
which then could - with caution - be used in trade.
The effect, it was thought, was to discourage other
states with a few exceptions from competing with
their own space technologies. U.S. policy
consistently tried to keep its allies and others tied
to the U.S. The costs of competition were
sufficiently high that most states would not
compete if they had ready access to high quality
U.S. products.
Beginning in 1986 with the Space Shuttle
Challenger accident, that strategy has been
chipped away. First in launch technologies, the
U.S. fell behind in the global marketplace – that
dominance had been artificially sustained by
Space Shuttle subsidies that evaporated in the
aftermath. Second, the changes in ITAR
implementation cut U.S. trade ties with its
existing customer base and rendered U.S. space
technologies much less competitive in world
markets. Customers lost are difficult to recover
since satellite contracts come at intervals, not
continuously. Assuming that the quality is roughly
comparable customers are unlikely to return to a
supplier thought more difficult and arbitrary.
The Future, Such As It Is
What has occurred is that the U.S. has succeeded
in placing its space technology export trade in a
“bubble.” Penetrating the bubble requires buyers
to negotiate an often slow and arbitrary ITAR
15
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licensing process. Potential customers are being
driven to other suppliers, and states capable of
developing such space technologies, now as a
result of U.S. actions, are encouraged to further
develop their own equivalents. Once those steps
are taken, it is difficult for those states to reverse
their course. The reality is that choice, the U.S.
has chosen to render its space industry less
competitive.18
By less competitive, we refer to the reality that
other states are replacing the U.S. in the market
place. In addition, U.S. policy, contrary to ITAR’s
purpose, is forcing other states to become more
heavily engaged in developing their own space
technologies. The U.S. loses out when it becomes
isolated within the global market place. Other
states and their space professionals can no longer
interact easily with U.S. professionals. Both sides
lose, but the damage affects the U.S. more in the
loss of cross-fertilization of ideas and
technologies.
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Bureaucratic Politics Run Amok:
The United States and Satellite Export Controls
Dr. Eligar Sadeh
Associate Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

The case of export controls of United States
(U.S.) commercial satellites is characterized by
bureaucratic politics leading to policy outcomes
that are not rational, i.e., the desired outcome of
national security is not met and commerce in the
satellite sector is harmed. The constraints to
rational policy making are a result of competition,
conflict, and protectionism, the “bureaucratic
politics,” among the relevant actors including the
U.S. President and Congress, Department of State
(State), Department of Commerce (Commerce),
and Department of Defense (DOD). It is
bureaucratic politics that result in policies for
licensing the export of commercial satellites that
are far from orderly, stable, and predictable.1
The crux of the political issue revolves around
bureaucratic control and jurisdiction over the
licensing process for export of commercial
satellites. Since commercial satellites represent a
dual-use space technology,2 bureaucratic politics
exist between the framing of export controls as a
matter of national security versus a matter of
business and commerce. The national security
advocates, among them the president, congress,
State, and DOD, view commercial satellites and
the related technologies as items to be controlled
for export within the same legal regime that
controls export and trafficking of arms. State,
through the Office of Defense Trade Controls
Policy, is the bureaucratic entity that governs this
1
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satellite export controls since 1990,” Space Policy
16:3 (2000).
2
Commercial satellites are clearly intended for
commercial use and applications, but do represent
applications and technologies that could be used
for military purposes and military satellite
development.

regime, known as the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the associated
Munitions Control List (MCL). DOD, through
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
assists State in implementing its regulatory
authority.
The commercial space advocates, among them
the president and congress, especially from 1988
to 1998, Commerce, and the aerospace and
defense industries, view commercial satellites as
an indicator of U.S. leadership with a strong
market share in the global commercial satellite
sector. Logically, the way to regulate export of
these satellites is through the legal regime that
governs
dual-use
technologies
used
commercially. This is the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) administered by the
Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security.
Commerce governs exports through the
Commerce Control List (CCL). From 1992 to
1999, this regime applied directly to the export of
commercial satellites.
This commercially-oriented approach enabled
China to compete within the U.S. market for the
launch of commercial satellites. From 1992 to
1996, the Chinese Long March rocket failed in
launching commercial satellites manufactured by
U.S.
companies
Hughes
Space
and
Communications (purchased by Boeing in 2000)
and Space Systems Loral. As required by the
insurance companies covering these companies’
assets, investigations into the launch failures were
concluded and submitted to Commerce for
approval. Commerce then authorized Hughes and
Loral to communicate the technical reports to the
Chinese launch officials. The transfer of the
reports sparked political controversy over the
statutory authority of Commerce to allow such a
17
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transfer without the proper review and oversight
by the State Department.
Specifically, the controversy focused on the
export of knowledge dealing with the reliability
of space launch vehicle technology, and more
generally, was linked to the issue of ballistic
missiles and U.S.Chinese relations. Dual-use
Congress
technologies…are
investigated this
issue of transfer viewed as
through
the sensitive items to
Report of the be controlled.
Select Committee
on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the Peoples’ Republic of China (known as the
Cox Report), and determined that Hughes and
Loral transferred to China, in violation of U.S.
export control laws− the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976 and the ITAR regime− missile design
information and knowledge that improved the
reliability of the Chinese Long March rocket
useful for civil and military purposes.3
The congressional response led to the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
that directed sole export control responsibility to
the State Department using the ITAR/MCL
regime for commercial satellites. State’s
jurisdiction began in March of 1999, and
continues through this writing in 2007. According
to many space leaders, the application of ITAR to
commercial
space
technologies
is
a
3

Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the Peoples’ Republic of China (United States
House
of
Representatives,
1999).
See
http://www.house.gov/coxreport (accessed 11
December 2006).
Both Boeing and Loral were fined by the U.S.
federal government for the export violations and
both companies paid fines in 2002. Boeing was
also charged with similar export violations
concerning Sea Launch− a joint venture with
Russian, Ukrainian, and Norwegian companies−
during this same period.

misapplication of the regime and is one of the top
space policy issues requiring congressional
redress.4
International and Domestic Environments
To assess the case of export controls and
commercial satellites, it is important to first
explain how national security and commercial
space advocates’ respective policy preferences,
needs, wants, demands, and expectations, are
influenced by the international and domestic
environments. The international and domestic
environments date back to the Cold War and the
issue of how to control dual-use technologies.
The concern, then and now, is that such
technologies can be used for the development of
arms that can lead to proliferation of ballistic
missiles, and nuclear, biological, and chemical
weaponry. Dual-use technologies with these
potential applications are viewed by national
security advocates as sensitive items to be
controlled.
One aspect of control lies with the statutory
authority within the U.S. for dual-use
technologies. This authority lies with the Export
Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 in which
congress delegated to the executive branch the
legal authority to regulate foreign commerce by
controlling and licensing exports. EAA is the
domestic environment from which the Commerce
Department’s EAR regime emerged. Of note, the
EAA expired in September 1990; reauthorization
of EAA took place for short periods with the last
incremental extension expiring in August of
2001. Since then, no new congressional
legislation has been passed to either reauthorize
or rewrite EAA, and the regime functions on the
basis of presidential authority under the
International Emergency Economics Powers Act.

4

The Space Report: The Guide to Global Space
Activities (Space Foundation, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, 2006); and Space 2030: Exploring the
Future of Space Applications (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,
France, 2004).
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Within the context of the post-September 11,
2001 (9/11) environment and the resulting
emphasis on national security, at times to the
detriment of commercial interests, the
congressional failure to act on the EAA further
strengthens and maintains the State-led ITAR
regime for control of commercial satellites.
Furthermore, the origins of the EAA are Cold
War related and originate from the Export
Control Act of 1949. Even though the EAA of
1979 represents a lessening of restrictive export
control in comparison to the Export Control Act
and subsequent amendments to that Act, the legal
regime is a relic of Cold War international
politics and national security rivalries.5 EAA has
not been sufficiently adapted as an export control
regime for the post Cold War international
environment of non-traditional security concerns,
developments in space technologies, capabilities
and applications, and the emergence of global
commercial space activities.
A second aspect of control deals with the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, the basis for the
ITAR export control regime. This regime was
also established during the Cold War environment
and has not undergone any statutory changes.
Further, neither State nor DOD made any changes
to the implementation modalities of any of these
Cold War regimes.6 During 1999-2000, both the
president and congress noted the need to review
the arms export control regime to streamline the
processing of applications for export licenses.
Neither State nor DOD acted on these
recommendations. The issue of delays and the
cost of bureaucratic compliance in the granting of
export licenses is one of the key concerns of the
commercial space advocates; these concerns
translate into an economic issue for the
commercial satellite sector. The economic issue
5

Ian F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act:
Evolution, Provisions, and Debate (United States
Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, updated May 5, 2005).
6
Defense Trade, Arms Export Control System in
the Post-9/11 Environment (United States
Government Accountability Report, February
2005).

also posits a barrier to entry for new space
commercial companies, often referred to as
alternative space, that are attempting to enter into
existing markets, such as space launch services,
or to develop new markets, such as space tourism.
A third aspect dealing with the control issue
exists at the international level. In 1949, a
multilateral export control regime called the
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (CoCom), involving North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, was
established. This regime mirrored U.S. domestic
controls as established with the Export Control
Act of 1949. CoCom advanced restrictive export
controls on sensitive dual-use technologies at the
multilateral level. The regime was dissolved in
1994 and replaced in 1996 by the Wassenaar
Arrangement
on
Export
Controls
for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement, as
compared to CoCom, lessened export controls of
dual-use technologies at the international level
and is more loosely organized with more limited
institutional structures. It relies on consensus by
state members, frequently resulting in a lowest
common denominator approach for multilateral
export control, minimal reporting requirements
preventing pre-export consultations among state
members, and a lack of authority among state
members to block transactions of other state
members.7 In addition, the liberal multilateral
regime that emerged with Wassenaar no longer
sought multilateral control over commercial
satellite
technology
or
expertise.
This
development influenced the U.S. environment
and raised national security concerns when
dealing with the export of dual-use technologies.
In the end, the liberalization of the international
legal regime is a factor that favors the national
security space advocates’ position and their
preference for ITAR as the regime to control and
license exports of commercial satellites and the
related technologies.

7

Ian F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act:
Evolution, Provisions, and Debate (United States
Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, updated May 5, 2005).
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Communications Channels
Given an understanding of the policy preferences
of the relevant actors, what then are the
communications channels through which the
policy of export control is applied? This is largely
a function of the relevant bureaucratic strategic
cultures. The strategic cultures of the national
security advocates versus the space commerce
advocates frame the political debates and
arguments. This framing represents the
organizational lenses, images, and “rules of the
game” regarding export controls of commercial
satellites.
Commercial space advocates frame the export
control issue through the lens of foreign
availability of technology. The contention is that
the proliferation of technology cannot be
effectively controlled and U.S. dominance of
space technology cannot be assumed. The
globalization of space commerce points to the
fact that unilateral controls will not stop foreign
states from acquiring the technologies. Thus, U.S.
dominance in space commerce is diminished,
while foreign businesses win new markets and
gain incentives to enter into new markets.8 All
this is complicated by the fact that as space
commerce is increasingly global many
components in the commercial satellite sector are
manufactured
worldwide
and
considered
commercial commodities. ITAR is not designed
to deal with the global nature of the industry and
the outcome provides an incentive for foreign
commercial satellite developers to reduce
dependence on U.S. satellite components due to
delays associated with the U.S. export licensing
process. The emerging trend is one where U.S.
satellite manufacturing companies, which must
8

Export controls on space commerce create risk
through uncertainties, result in losses of markets
because of impacts on space industry’s ability to
serve international markets, and prevent efficient
industry restructuring to the forces of
globalization. See Space 2030: Exploring the
Future of Space Applications (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris,
France, 2004).

adhere to ITAR restrictions, are at a growing
disadvantage as inventory of “ITAR-free,” i.e., no
U.S. manufactured components, satellites expand
abroad.9
In addition to the economic argument, space
commerce advocates see a link between national
security and robust export control industries, and
favor an export control regime that is streamlined,
less complex, and not an impediment to exports.
As an example, Commerce presumes that the
issuing of an export license is routine unless good
cause can be shown otherwise. Space commerce
advocates argue that national security is
undermined when exports are impeded, resulting
in the loss of U.S. market
ITAR is share. The limitation of U.S.
not satellite components through
controls leads to greater
designed export
foreign
research
and
to deal development
(R&D)
investments
in
this
area.
In
with the
these foreign R&D
global turn,
investments can be leveraged
nature of to achieve parity and even
the surpass the U.S. technological
In conclusion, space
industry lead.
commerce advocates frame
commercial
satellite
technology as possessing no inherent strategic or
military relevance, a view shared with the state
members of the Wassenaar Arrangement with the
exception of the U.S.10
9

In Europe, Alcatel Alenia Space and the
European Aeronautic Defense and Space
Company have both made it company policy to
build ITAR-free commercial satellites.
10
Wassenaar Arrangement state members in
addition to the U.S., include: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
and United Kingdom.
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In contrast, the national security advocates
maintain that there is a need to control
commercial space exports as sensitive military
technologies. This control prevents the
proliferation of technologies that could be used by
hostile, rogue states against the U.S. or its allies,
secures DOD’s reliance on the commercial sector
for R&D as a result of declining defense budgets
in the 1990s, and sustains the U.S. military use of
commercial space assets for operations, including
commercial satellites for telecommunications and
remote sensing purposes. National security is
framed in ideological and “war-fighting” terms−
limiting the diffusion of technology advances U.S.
foreign policy interests and enhances national
security. The framing of export control as a
national security issue compelled congress to
place commercial satellites and related
technologies within the authority of the
ITAR/MCL regime.11 The Chinese Long March
“satellite scandal” discussed earlier and the events
of 9/11 served to strengthen this worldview and
weaken political attempts to reform the export
control regime.
Conversion and Outputs
Since the view herein is that the case of export
controls is one of bureaucratic politics leading to
policy outcomes that are not rational, how the
relevant organizations interact, i.e., the U.S.
President and Congress, and the relevant
bureaucracies, is crucial to understand. A rational
policy-making process suggest outputs that serve
the desired communications channels of at least
one group of advocates. In this case, the policy
outputs, albeit unintended, do not ideally realize
the policy preferences of either the national
security or commercial space advocates. On one
hand, ITAR can damage national security by
placing legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the
U.S. military use of commercial space assets that

11

It is the sense of the U.S. Congress that business
interests must not be placed above national
security interests. See Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.

rely on a robust satellite industry.12 This includes
risks to the military use of: commercial satellites
for operational support; advanced satellite
technologies developed in the commercial sector;
and foreign suppliers for satellite components and
services needed for military operations. On the
other hand, export control of commercial
satellites vis-à-vis ITAR has made the U.S. space
and satellite component industry less competitive
internationally and contributed to a weakening of
U.S. market position.13
How did the issue of export controls of
commercial satellites result in policy outputs that
are not desired? The answer to this question lies
in the nature of how the relevant political actors
serve as conversion structures. Prior to 1992,
export control of commercial satellites fell within
the purview of the ITAR regime, but beginning in
1988 President Reagan began to loosen export
restrictions on commercial satellites to keep U.S.
12

Thomas Moorman, U.S. Space Industrial Base
Study (Booz-Allen & Hamilton: McLean,
Virginia, 2000).
13
Since the application of the ITAR regime for
export control of commercial satellites in March
1999, U.S. global share of commercial satellite
manufacturing revenues fell to 41% in 2005 from
51% in 2000; U.S. commercial satellite
component suppliers captured 90% of the global
market in 1995, whereas by 2000 they retained
only 56%; U.S. satellite firms lost approximately
$5 billion between March 1999 and the end of
2001; and, from 1999 to 2004, it is estimated that
U.S. share of the lucrative geostationary satellite
market declined by 16%. See State of the Satellite
Industry Report (Futron Corporation, Washington,
DC, June 2006); Robert D. Lamb, Satellites,
Security, and Scandal: Understanding the Politics
of Export Controls (University of Maryland,
College Park, Center for International and
Security Studies at Maryland, January 2005);
Space 2030: Exploring the Future of Space
Applications (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, France,
2004); and State of the Space Industry
(International
Space
Business
Council,
Washington, DC, 2000).
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industry competitive in global markets and to
advance national space policy for the
development of the commercial space sector. The
following Bush and Clinton administrations
shared these policy preferences and acted to these
ends. Bush and Clinton used presidential legal
authority to waive trade sanctions with China put
in place through congressional legislation
following the Tiananmen Square massacre. The
sanctions waived included commercial satellites
for export to launch on the Chinese Long March.
The policy conflict between the president and
congress set the stage for the Chinese satellite
scandal and the resulting 1999 congressional
legislation that reversed the loosening of export
controls initiated by Reagan.
The theme of policy
conflict continued as the export
Bush made use of
presidential authority regulatory
to extend EAA and bureaucracies
pocket
vetoed
a at Commerce,
congressional bill that
would have amended State, and
and extended the full Defense lacked
EAA on a permanent the requisite
basis.14 In this bill,
congress took more technical
of a national security expertise
position on the export
of dual-use items in conflict with Bush’s post
Cold War commercial view for the increased role
of economic power in national security. Bush
sustained this view by removing all items from
MCL that were on the CoCom dual-use list. This
led to split jurisdiction, from 1992-1996, between
State and Commerce for export controls. An
interagency review process initiated by Bush
determined which of the dual-use items listed on
MCL could be transferred to CCL. Under the
Commerce
Department’s
business-friendly
licensing process, these transfers made it easier to
export some commercial satellites for foreign
launches. Less advanced commercial satellites
14

The congressional bill pocket vetoed by
President Bush was the Omnibus Export
Amendments Act of 1990.

were exported as commercial goods under the
EAR regime. Throughout the story of commercial
satellite export controls, State and Commerce
have both sought influence and authority, and
split jurisdiction was viewed by the actors as a
compromise way to resolve this dispute.15
Nevertheless, the differences in strategic cultures
of each bureaucracy sustained the struggle for
political influence over export controls.
As a result of split jurisdiction, the technical
parameters for determining whether commercial
satellites should be treated as munitions or dualuse commercial goods became unworkable by
1995. One of the issues that emerged was that the
export regulatory bureaucracies at Commerce,
State, and Defense lacked the requisite technical
expertise to determine which technologies to
control as munitions versus which could be
exported as commercial commodities.16 This was
exacerbated by the fact that regulatory monitors
were asked to implement near impossible tasks−
apply overlapping, self-contradictory rigid sets of
rules and track all hardware for export without
explicit guidance on what to protect for reasons of
national security and what are commercial
commodities. Consequently, split jurisdiction was
abandoned as a policy preference by the actors. In
October 1996, and until March 1999, congress
assigned Commerce primary jurisdiction. Since
then, commercial satellites and related
technologies are listed on MCL and regulated for
export by State.
The moves undertaken by the political actors to
transfer jurisdiction to Commerce were met with
countermoves by State export officials
determined to exert their full authority to the
extent permissible by law. The political process
15

Marcia S. Smith, Space Launch Vehicles:
Government Activities, Commercial Competition,
and
Satellite
Exports
(United
States
Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, updated 1 January 2006).
16
Preserving America’s Strength in Satellite
Technology, A Report of the CSIS Satellite
Commission
(Center
for
Strategic
and
International Studies, Washington, DC, 2002).
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underlying the transfer to Commerce’s
jurisdiction was characterized by bureaucratic
politics and conflicts. Both export control
bureaucracies sought regulatory authority and
their self-interest to do so became a goal in-andof-itself. The bureaucratic politics concept that
“where you sit defines who you are” applies
directly in this case; State and Commerce
regulators were explicitly tied to the strategic
cultural perspectives of their organizations. As
policy preferences for Commerce’s jurisdiction
moved to fruition by 1996, State pursued
enforcement regulations that made it increasingly
difficult and costly for satellite companies to
export if even a single component remained
subject to State control through MCL.
Congressional reaction to the Chinese affair and
the sustained efforts of national security
advocates advancing their case for export controls
led to congressional legislation that resulted in
sole State jurisdiction in 1999. This action was
reactive rather than rational. One indication of
this is that the export violations committed by
Hughes, Loral, and Boeing did not damage U.S.
national security in any material way; the
expertise transferred to China only marginally
benefited Chinese missile programs by improving
launch reliability.17 Many of the breaches were
little more than technical violations of State
export control regulations dealing with services
that could “in theory” be applied for national
security purposes.18
The policy output of State jurisdiction is
suboptimal; rather than seeking a compromise,
State countered the preferred policy preferences
of the commercial space advocates. Given the
drive for bureaucratic self-preservation, State
17

Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the Peoples’ Republic of China (United States
House of Representatives, 1999).
18
Robert D. Lamb, Satellites, Security, and
Scandal: Understanding the Politics of Export
Controls (University of Maryland, College Park,
Center for International and Security Studies at
Maryland, January 2005).

took the congressional mandate for sole
jurisdiction and unilaterally implemented its
approach, through administrative rule making, to
realize its national security perspective.
This raises a number of issues. First is the issue of
what was intended by the Cox Report
recommendations, which had prompted congress
to give State commercial satellite licensing
authority. It is not clear whether the
recommendations intended to control the export
diffusion of technology from solely a national
security standpoint, or to control the technology
diffusion in a way to satisfy both national security
and commercial advocates’ preferences. This
ambiguity provided State the opportunity to
advance their national security perspective.
Concomitantly, officials at State expressed their
desire to work with space commercial businesses
by facilitating and approving ITAR applications,
and viewed the political problem as rooted in the
congressional mandate for State’s sole
jurisdiction and enforcement of the export control
law.19 In fact, State does approve the vast
majority of export license applications.20 The
issue with the export control of commercial
satellites within the ITAR regime is not one of
denial of licenses, but rather in how State
enforces the law. Enforcement leads to excessive
delays and bureaucratic compliance with export
regulations that are a cost to the commercial
satellite sector.
What is also clear is that State is enforcing the
law in ways that are not necessarily what
congress intended, yet congress itself fails to act
on this problem. To illustrate, the Cox Report
called for: congressional reauthorization of EAA;
continuous updating of the export control regime;
and streamlining the licensing procedures to
provide greater transparency, predictability, and
19

Interview, Ann Ganzer, Director of the Office of
Defense Trade Controls Policy, Department of
State, The Space Show, 12 February 2006. See
www.thespaceshow.com (accessed 4 June 2007).
20
Since the listing of commercial satellites within
the ITAR export control regime in 1999, only 1%
to 2% of all export license requests are denied.
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certainty. In all these areas, neither State nor
congress took any substantive actions. Not only
did State act unilaterally to do other than what
was recommended by the Cox Report, but
congress also failed in its basic oversight role to
hold State accountable to congressional policy
preferences. This dynamic, together with the
events of 9/11, stalled reform advocates’ efforts.
Although there is pending legislation in congress
to follow through on the Cox Report
recommendations, the advocates are in the
minority. The proposed congressional Satellite
Trade and Security Act of 2001 went as far as to
restore Commerce jurisdiction, though the
measure failed to advance, and through the 110th
Congress of today there have been no serious
attempts to introduce subsequent legislation or to
put the issue on the agenda.21 Other barriers to
reform include export risks and organizational
constraints on expediting State’s process for
exporting commercial satellites.22 These barriers
stem from the fact that technical expertise at State
and Defense is lacking. Even though some
incremental advances in addressing these barriers
have taken place, as recommended by the Cox
Report, the policy lesson of spilt jurisdiction is
that determining risk is in many ways unworkable
and the control of satellite exports through the
national security lens does not readily lend itself
to streamlining the licensing process.

abroad, but to allow the transfer of information
necessary to bid on new projects as well as
respond to business requests for information on
existing systems. Of note is that in 2000,
following the Cox Report recommendations,
congress allocated additional funds to State to
allow for addressing the issues of technical
expertise and expediting the licensing process. At
that time, State unilaterally acted to shift these
funds within the bureaucracy away from the
congressional intent. The 2004 mandate by
congress is more closely monitored, and State is
working to deal with the expertise and delay
barriers. One significant effort underway is the
development of an electronic filing system for
export licenses at State.

A congressional bill to expedite the State
Department process for exporting commercial
satellites, particularly to states considered friendly
to the U.S., such as NATO allies and other major
non-NATO allies, was signed into law in 2004.
With this bill, every effort was made to allay
national security concerns, while attempting to
find ways to not only sell commercial satellites

23

In addition to the Satellite Trade and Security
Act of 2001, congressional sponsors have
proposed
amendments
to
the
Export
Administration Act and other separate bills that
would return export licensing authority for
commercial satellites to Commerce.
22
The inability to accurately measure risk to
national security is one of the most serious
problems for the system of export controls.
21

The policy dynamic discussed earlier, State
countering Commerce, persisted under sole State
jurisdiction. State unilaterally reversed the
Commerce approach that exempted many items
from requiring licenses,23 extended ITAR controls
to U.S. allies for commercial satellites,24 and
advanced regulations that required return of
hardware to its state of origin for repair. State also
issued retroactive regulations for the Technology
Assistance Agreements (TAAs) governing
technology transfers for satellites that had been
licensed by Commerce. TAAs are required for
marketing discussions and the exchange of basic
Commerce exempted basic items, like screws
and knobs for example, from export control.
24
The Strom Thurmond National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 included
language that MCL shall not necessarily apply to
the “export of a satellite or related items for
launch in, or by nationals of, a state that is a
member of NATO, or that is a major non-NATO
ally of the United States.” In implementing ITAR,
State interpreted this exception to apply only to
the mandated monitoring activities. Further, the
expanded definitions of satellite related
components, and the additions of defense
technical services and space insurance business
meetings as new areas needing export licenses,
led to the bureaucratic “micro-regulation” of the
U.S. commercial satellite industry in response to
accusations initially related to China.
24
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technical information with insurance companies
and launch service providers for satellites
exported and launched. State’s retroactive
approach created a situation where new
technology transfer licenses and TAAs had to be
issued for satellites already operating in orbit.
State even acted to reverse Reagan’s decision that
exempted fundamental research information from
an export license.25 Export directives to control
such information affect the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), universities,
and industry R&D as they require licenses for any
collaboration with foreign nationals on
fundamental research. In addition, State and
Defense practice intrusive monitoring, allowing
monitors’ access to proprietary knowledge.
Despite this, industry has not objected in any
direct way due to a fear of congressional reaction
and their dependence on governmental
contracts.26

general sense was that U.S. business and
commercial interests should never trump national
security interests. State succeeded in advancing
their national security worldview as the U.S.
national interest, a costly situation for commercial
space and their advocates.

Conclusions
The commercial satellite export case posits
damaging consequences for U.S. technology and
business leadership in space. The political process
began with the incremental political liberalization
of export controls in response to the changing
international post Cold War environment and the
rapid increase in space commerce globally. The
process then transitioned to congressional action
to overturn the then existing satellite export
control regime in favor of Commerce jurisdiction.
All the while, the process was driven by
bureaucratic politics between Commerce and
State. In the context of the post 9/11 world and
the security concerns the attack generated, the
25

In 1985, President Regan issued an ITAR
exemption for fundamental research conducted at
U.S. universities. National Security Decision
Directive 189, 21 September 1985.
26
In March of 2007, the Coalition for Security and
Competitiveness, that does include a number of
professional associations that represent the
aerospace industry, began advocating for export
control reform on dual-use items. See
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Chasing Satellites: Identifying Export Control Problems and Solutions
John Douglass
Aerospace Industries Association President (Retired December 2007)

In a globalized world where the United States
(U.S.) faces threats from terrorist groups, rogue
states, and others, effective export controls remain
essential to our national security. These controls
keep our most advanced technologies, weapons,
and equipment out of the hands of our adversaries
and rivals— an increasingly difficult task.
With these emerging security and economic
challenges, however, technological cooperation
with friends and allies is critical. Global trade can
leverage the technological competitiveness and
innovation of the U.S. industry and our foreign
friends to build interoperability, trust, and
capabilities critical to keeping the nation secure
and advancing our interests abroad. This
cooperation strengthens America’s technological
edge, sustains the industrial base, and enhances
economic security.
Technology trade and cooperation, which is often
subject to export controls, play a central role in
supporting the aerospace and defense industry’s
630,000 American jobs.1 According to Aerospace
Industries Association (AIA) estimates, U.S.
aerospace companies posted a $54.8 billion trade
surplus in 2006, while the nation’s merchandise
import-export deficit exceeded $600 billion.2 The

1

Aerospace Facts and Figures, www.aiaaerospace.org/stats/stats.cfm
(accessed
5
November 2007).
2
The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA)
represents more than 100 regular and 180
associate member companies, and operates as the
largest professional organization in the United
States across three lines of business: space
systems, national defense, and civil aviation. AIA
represents a total high-technology workforce of

aerospace industry exports 40 percent of its total
product and, during some economic quarters,
nearly 70 percent of its civil aircraft and
components.3
The current U.S. export control system hurts the
aerospace industry’s ability to effectively support
the nation’s security and economic interests. This
outdated system also increases costs and risk in
our programs and closes off business
opportunities with U.S. customers, partners, and
allies. As a result, our friends abroad are losing
trust in our ability to exchange technology in a
timely and rational manner. These challenges are
particularly acute in the space sector of the
aerospace industry. Export control process and
policy barriers continue to rise even as political,
scientific, and business trends have led the U.S. to
rely more heavily on foreign partners for costeffective technologies, scientific talent, and sales
and opportunities to sustain the U.S. industrial
base.
Numerous studies, ongoing and recent, are aiming
to establish a causal link between export controls
and challenges facing the American space
industrial base. These studies all focus on the
impact of Section 1513(a) of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1999, which shifted export control
jurisdiction of commercial satellites and related
items from the Commerce Department, which is
responsible for licensing “dual-use” exports, to
the State Department, which monitors the
licensing of U.S. munitions list exports.

640,000 that manufactures products for customers
around the world.
3
AIA Aerospace Facts and Figures.
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Challenges to the Export Control System
The U.S. export control system was designed
during an era of U.S. technological dominance, a
time in our history clearly defined by a bipolar
security environment and bilateral trade.
Protecting access to U.S. technology, the system’s
primary imperative, was much more easily
accomplished under those circumstances. Trends
in globalization, technology, and security threats
have both redefined the system’s standard of
effectiveness and made the job much more
difficult.
Globalization
has created an Changes in the
interdependence
global security
between
the
U.S. and its environment
foreign partners exacerbate the
that is both
risk-averse
valuable
and
irreversible. It is licensing behavior.
no
longer
possible, or even
desirable, for American companies to have purely
domestic supply chains or focus exclusively on
the domestic market. Foreign-sourced technology
is sometimes better and more cost effective, and
foreign customers offer sales opportunities that
can make up for shortfalls in U.S. public and
private sector acquisition. The new flow of
information and technology is no longer a
bilateral exchange, but a multilateral network with
each move often requiring an export license.
These factors account for the eight percent annual
growth rate in export license applications cited by
the State Department in the last few years.4
The export control system is tasked with
evaluating the export of each element of
technology, from data to components to entire
4

Opening Statement of Chairman Brad Sherman,
House
Subcommittee
on
Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade, Hearing on Exports
Controls: Are We Protecting Security and
Facilitating Exports, 26 July 2007.

weapons platforms, for security risks. The private
sector drives today’s technological innovation at a
level of complexity difficult to monitor, let alone
thoroughly understand, by a government-operated
export
control
system.
Even
modern
“commercial”
technology
is
increasingly
sophisticated and arguably at some level capable
of “military uses.” Taken together, these two
dynamics force the government to rely on
industry, from primes to the lowest supplier, to
know what licenses they should apply for and
when, and woe to the company that gets the
answers to those questions wrong. Liability
concerns of the regulator and the manufacturer
result in risk-averse behavior from both parties,
causing the proliferation of both arguably
unnecessary license applications that clog the
system and of inordinately stringent decisions on
what can be exported and under what conditions.
Changes in the global security environment
exacerbate the risk-averse licensing behavior.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the U.S. has focused on addressing security
threats from both traditional states and sub-state
actors who can and do operate in the same places
where the U.S. is sending technology. Moreover,
our allies no longer share with the U.S. our
position regarding the level or source of these
threats, or the appropriate response to them.
Consequently, licensing exports to even our
closest allies can be viewed as risky to a
government regulator.
In the end, both the political and economic
resources necessary to address these trends have
been absent in the U.S. export control system.
Companies have repeatedly voiced concern that
processing times are unpredictable and often
extend 60 to 90 days before the review process is
even initiated. Decisions and conditions on similar
licenses can vary considerably and can, at times,
even contradict the regulations governing the
export control process.
All too often, discussions of the problems with the
U.S. export control system move into esoteric
realms of regulatory interpretation and legislative
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intent, relying on anecdotal rather than verifiable
justification. While there may be a vague
consensus that some problems exist within the
export control system, industry has struggled to
convince the administration or U.S. Congress to
take action, let alone provide compelling
solutions.
Commercial Satellites and Why Studies on the
Space Industrial Base Matter
The application of export controls to commercial
satellites illustrates the impact of these trends and
the futility of past attempts to achieve substantive
policy change. To address the transfer of data
from U.S. companies to Chinese authorities after
the failed attempt of a Chinese rocket to launch a
U.S. commercial satellite, congress passed
legislation in the 1999 Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act placing commercial
satellites and related items on the U.S. munitions
list. The transfer of commercial satellites, their
components and any technical data to a foreign
entity is now subject to the most stringent
licensing treatment of the federal government, the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
and its associated munitions list.
As a result, U.S. commercial satellite
manufacturers forego sales to China or use of
Chinese launch vehicles and obtain licenses for all
other foreign sales or launches. The time, effort,
and cost of obtaining these licenses are onerous,
but manageable, given the downturn in sales
opportunities for commercial satellites in recent
years.5 The consequences of this policy shift have
been much more significant, however, for
commercial satellite component manufacturers.
To respond to any Request for Proposal (RFP)
from a foreign commercial satellite manufacturer,
a U.S. component manufacturer must first obtain a
license to send relevant technical and marketing
data. While the queue for all munitions list export
licenses has grown, each license in the queue has
also become that much more complex and
therefore takes that much longer to evaluate.
5

AIA Aerospace Facts and Figures.

Assuming a U.S. component manufacturer gets a
license in time to compete for and win a given
contract, subsequent communications and
hardware transfers between the U.S. manufacturer
and its foreign customer are all subject to advance
licensing requirements. Changes in the conditions
of the transfer, such as allowing a new person in a
foreign company to access the information or
transferring information to another third-party, are
commonplace in global manufacturing, but would
result in a need for new licenses. Once a
component on the U.S. munitions list is
incorporated into any system, commercial or
military, the government must give its approval,
possibly with conditions, before that system is
moved or sold.
The mounting frustration of foreign commercial
satellite manufacturers under these circumstances
is both reasonable and unsurprising. The ability of
U.S. component manufacturers to respond to
requests for information or meet shipment
deadlines can be called into doubt when export
licenses are required. In practice, regulators often
interpret ITAR to require licenses for all U.S.origin components, including nuts, bolts, washers,
and hoses designed or modified for use in a
commercial satellite, irrespective of how
innocuous or low-tech they may appear. Since
foreign manufacturers do not know who will
eventually buy their satellites, they are wary of
seeking permission from the U.S. government for
the eventual movements of these components
either to complete the manufacturing process or
the eventual sale of what they believe is a purely
commercial product. This is especially true if it
means abandoning the Chinese market, to which
foreign commercial satellite manufacturers have
exclusive access in the absence of any U.S.
competitors.
Two responses to these frustrations have
negatively
impacted
American
satellite
component manufacturers. First, the number of
foreign
commercial
satellite
component
manufacturers who would otherwise not have
been
viable
competition
against
U.S.
manufacturers has grown steadily. These foreign
component manufacturers, unencumbered by
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licensing requirements and often with the
financial support of their home governments, have
successfully taken away market share from U.S.
companies.6 The second response, a preference
both state and unstated for acquisition of “ITARfree” components by foreign commercial satellite
manufacturers and their customers, has
compounded the impact on U.S. commercial
satellite component manufacturers.7
In the nine years since the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act, the
aerospace and defense industry has been
unsuccessful in arguing for a need to revisit the
application of export controls on commercial
satellites and related components. The external
barriers to change can be traced, in part, to
legitimate concerns about compromising U.S.
national security interests with hasty policy
adjustments and the strained relationship between
the relevant congressional committees, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and the State Department
when it comes to addressing export control
matters. These tensions have previously
preempted any productive discussion of
viewpoints, let alone identification of ways to
improve the status-quo management of the export
control system.
The aerospace industry also shoulders part of the
blame. The industry’s inability to provide
definitive proof of the damage inflicted by the
current system has been an obstacle to a
successful campaign for this policy issue.
Sympathetic officials within congress and the
administration have, for years, asked for industry
cooperation to quantify the impact of the
regulations. The recent proliferation of
government supported studies on export controls
and the space industrial base are a response to the
absence of reliable data.8
6

Ibid.
“China's Rocket Service Makes Inroads, Irks
U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2007.
8
The Space Policy Institute, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Organization for
7

The initial explanation for this data void was to
point out the challenge of isolating the impact of
export controls on a loss of sales compared to a
general downturn in the commercial satellite
marketplace. There are times when companies
lose contracts without being given a reason why
or choose not to bid on a contract because they
know they cannot meet RFP deadlines, which
have shrunk considerably over the years as
customers embrace greater options among nonU.S. component manufacturers, and no longer
have to work with timetables convenient for U.S.
manufacturers.
The other challenge
faced by our industry
is the difficulty in
acting collectively on
such a sensitive issue.
No company wants to
be the “poster child”
for export control
problems, especially
if it is trying to
convince customers
that it can be a
reliable supplier in spite of export license
requirements. In some cases, companies that may
have faced enough challenges to overcome their
hesitation to “testify” either decided to abandon
the product line or went out of business.

the industry’s
inability to
provide
definitive proof
of the damage
inflicted…has
been an
obstacle

Despite these challenges, interest in export
controls has recently surged within the
administration and the U.S. Congress for three
reasons. First, security and economic cooperation
in the international arena is the new status-quo for
the government, the military, and the private
sector. Second, compliance challenges with export
control policies and processes are more complex.
Compliance-related delays or failing to conduct
business because of compliance requirements
Economic Cooperation and Development,
Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Space
Foundation have all completed studies on export
controls and the space industrial base between
2001-2007.
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have more apparent security, economic, and even
civil impacts than ever before.9 Third, compliance
challenges are no longer just the concern of a few
large companies. Suppliers are becoming more
internationally oriented, despite a lack of
experience and resources to navigate the maze of
U.S. export controls. AIA and its partners in the
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness have
spent the last year supporting and spreading this
growing interest. In the process, the hope is to
create a hospitable policy environment for the
results and recommendations of these satellite and
space industrial base studies.
The Coalition for Security and
Competitiveness
AIA is a founding member of the Coalition for
Security and Competitiveness, an alliance of
eighteen industry and trade associations
committed to developing a modernized export
control system. The coalition is advocating the
development of a modern export control system
that:
• accurately
identifies
and
safeguards
sensitive
and
militarily critical technologies;
• enhances U.S. technological
leadership and global industrial
competitiveness through more
responsive
and
efficient
regulatory management;
• facilitates defense trade and
technological exchange with
allies and trusted partners;
9

For instance, during a hearing in July in the
House Science and Technology Committee’s
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Tommy
Holloway, chair of the congressionally-mandated
International Space Station (ISS) Independent
Safety Task Force warned that International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions
and objections by NASA’s International Partners
(IPs) to signing what the IPs believe are redundant
Technical Assistance Agreements “are a threat to
the safe and successful integration and operation
of the Station.”

supports
a
strong
U.S.
technology industrial base and
highly-skilled workforce;
• and
promotes
greater
multilateral cooperation with
our friends and allies on export
controls.10
A predictable, efficient, and transparent export
control system should enable America’s broader
national security strategy. The coalition has
argued that the current export control system lacks
these three basic qualities. The government must
do a better job of making decisions on export
authorizations in a timely manner. The Coalition
would like to see a system that can deliver
decisions on 95 percent of all license applications
in 30 days, not the current 55-plus days it often
takes.11 The license process must also be
predictably consistent with applicable laws,
regulations, and policies. Comparable export
applications under the same conditions should
receive the same or similar approvals in the same
or similar time frames. The rules governing the
license process must be interpreted and used
consistently, and the U.S. industry and its foreign
partners should be able to quickly and easily
access the status of their applications. The current
system is paradoxically hurting national security,
U.S. economic strength, and U.S. technological
competitiveness, and the problems will only
continue to worsen if no action is taken.
•

The coalition has focused its first phase of action
on improvements to the current system that could
have an immediate, positive impact on
predictability, efficiency, and transparency in
license processing. These recommendations were
intended to be measurable, attainable, and
meaningful. The coalition also agreed to focus, at
least initially, on process improvements that the
administration could implement under existing
statutes. Meanwhile, mindful of congressional
10

Additional information on the Coalition for
Security and Competitiveness and its associated
proposals
can
be
accessed
at
www.securityandcompetitiveness.org (accessed
15 November 2007).
11
Ibid.
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interest in this issue, the coalition is organizing
briefings with congressional committees and
offices on the importance of this issue and how
the coalition’s proposals will help pave the way
for a complete reexamination of the system.
Since commercial satellites and their components
are regulated by the U.S. munitions list, the
coalition’s defense trade proposals are profoundly
relevant and cut across all parts of the federal
government.12 The coalition has called on the
White House to restate the strategic policy
principles that govern the operation of the U.S.
export control system. This statement should
highlight the need to capture the full security and
economic benefits of prudent technology
exchange with our friends and allies. The
coalition also recommends the appointment of a
senior director at the National Security Council to
focus on conventional defense and dual-use
export controls by separating these issues from the
non-proliferation portfolio. The coalition has
called for the creation of a new presidential
advisory body to establish a dialogue between the
executive branch, congress, and industry on
defense trade and technology cooperation.
While the coalition is not challenging the
administration’s national security determinations
on transactions, decisions need to be made
consciously, consistently, and clearly at the
policy-making level. This is especially critical for
the rules governing the commodity jurisdiction
process, a process that determines whether the
State Department or Commerce Department has
jurisdiction over an export authorization. A
significant number of export licenses that clog up
the current system may, in fact, be unnecessary if
the interagency process that evaluates such

12

Statement of U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO), Director for Acquisition and
Sourcing,
Ann
Calvaresi-Barr,
House
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and
Trade, Hearing on Exports Controls: Are We
Protecting Security and Facilitating Exports, 26
July 2007.

transactions all follow the same regulatory
interpretation.
In commodity jurisdiction and other policy-related
cases where the interagency process must come to
a consensus decision, an interagency appeals
process for precedent-setting decisions would help
ensure that policy and process are consistent and
relevant to changing circumstances. Such quality
control, or a review of licenses denied or
“returned without action” (RWA), would be
helpful at the transaction level.The coalition has
offered defense proposals that will primarily
require the leadership of the State Department to
implement. The most immediate of these
proposals is funding the hiring of additional
licensing and agreements officers to handle the
eight percent annual growth rate in defense
license applications and the license backlogs that
have ranged from 5,000 to 10,000 licenses in
recent years.13 In addition to advocating for extra
personnel to handle this challenge, the coalition
asked the administration to consider and develop
new approaches to caseload management,
particularly the licensing caseload generated by
government programs with allies and partners.
New management approaches are needed to
reduce the number of authorizations related to a
given program and to facilitate efficient
interaction with program partners.
Finally, the coalition called for a more robust
electronic system for processing licenses that
enhances transparency. The system should track
not only the current status of license applications
across the entire interagency process, but also
their transit times and next steps against
mandatory timelines. The industry is interested in
tracking licenses that require congressional
notification from when they are first submitted to
the government to when they are sent to congress
for review.

13

See

www.securityandcompetitiveness.org/proposals/show/2241.
html (accessed 1 December 2007).
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A New Approach to Export Controls on
Satellite Components
There is a short-term, medium-term, and longterm way that the coalition’s efforts can directly
support U.S. commercial satellite component
manufacturers and, by extension, the space
industrial base. Given the status-quo legislative
situation that places commercial satellites and
related items on the munitions list, any
adjustments that improve the current processing
of munitions list export licenses by the State
Department will be useful. Satellite component
manufacturers would have a much easier time
meeting their customers’ deadlines and, almost
equally as important, incorporating predictable
timelines into communications and hardware
deliveries to their customers. American and
foreign satellite manufacturers using U.S.-origin
components would also experience fewer delays
in seeking approval for sales and launches
involving third-party countries. Needless to say,
all other space-related technologies controlled by
the State Department would enjoy the same
benefits.
In the medium-term, the
coalition’s call for a The coalition
renewed dialogue on
caseload management, has proposed
specifically improved that program
program licenses, could licenses
arguably be applied to
the challenges faced by expand to
commercial
satellite include more
and
component than major
manufacturers. In the
past, the aerospace weapons
industry has tried to programs.
take
advantage
of
program licenses that grant pre-approval for a
slate of transactions between U.S. and foreign
customers and partners. Eligibility for these
program licenses are currently restricted to major
weapons programs. The paperwork required to
prove compliance with the terms of a program
license is more time-consuming than simply
obtaining individual licenses for each transaction.
Applying for a program license requires

companies to lock in a significant amount of
information on what and how they will be
operating without much flexibility to address
changes in export transactions. In the end,
program licenses are less useful than continuing to
apply for licenses for individual transactions.
The coalition has proposed that program licenses
expand to include more than major weapons
programs. Ideally, these program licenses would
cover transactions between U.S. companies and
their foreign subsidiaries or parents, focused
research and development (R&D) projects on
critical technologies, such as anti-improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and missiles, and
possibly even commercial satellite platforms. To
be useful, these licenses must be more flexible
and less onerous than the cumulative requirements
for all license applications necessary for the same
set of transactions.
In the long-term, a legislative fix and a coalitionsupported regulatory fix will balance the national
security and economic imperatives driving export
controls on commercial satellites and their
components. The legislative language currently
references all commercial satellites and related
items. To the surprise of congressional staff
involved in the drafting of the original legislation,
the State Department has chosen to interpret this
language to eliminate any need to evaluate the
risk of exporting a commercial satellite
component. All commercial satellite components
are instead licensed and treated as munitions list
items:
I feel some sense of responsibility
for what happened,” said David
Garner, a retired Air Force colonel.
Garner had helped put together the
1998 legislation that was designed
to
add
commercial
communications satellites— like
those that had been implicated in
the transfer of sensitive technology
to the Chinese by a House
committee led by then Rep.
Christopher
Cox—
to
the
Munitions List, meaning that their
export would be overseen by the
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State Department rather than the
more
permissive
Commerce
Department. That was, Garner said,
exactly what he thought the
legislation did.
Shortly after the bill became law,
he recounted a meeting where he
and other officials discussed the
legislation. At that time, he said,
“we all had a pretty good sense of
what we were going to do, and
then the legal office of political
affairs at State said, “Well, you
know, all the parts and components
on those comsats are captured,
too.” We all sort of looked at each
other said, “I didn’t write that. Did
you write that?” None of us around
the table believed that that’s what
we had done, but in fact that’s
what ended up.”14
A legislative change that either eliminates the
reference to “related items” or even adds a
qualifier like “related items that have significant
military application” would clarify congressional
intent. The structure of the munitions list allows it
to capture all items designed or modified for use
by a specific munitions list line item, like
commercial satellites. With the legislative change,
commercial satellite component manufacturers
could make a case, specifically a commodity
jurisdiction request, to transfer an item back to
Commerce
Department
control
without
immediately being turned away because of the
legislation. Convincing lawmakers to explore
such a change would likely require credible
studies and recommendations that link export
controls and damage to the space industrial base
affecting U.S. security and economic interests.
A related and necessary step is adoption of the
coalition’s recommendations on commodity

jurisdiction evaluations.15 Existing export control
commodity jurisdiction regulations, specifically
sections 120.3 and 120.4 of ITAR, allow for
flexibility in determining the risk of an export
based on consideration of commercial availability
as well as military and intelligence applicability.
These ITAR sections are not being interpreted or
implemented in a consistent and predictable
fashion. Commodity jurisdiction decisions on
components have been based on purely cosmetic
modifications of commercial off-the-shelf
technology. In addition, the Commerce
Department’s expertise in analyzing commercial
applications of technology is not always valued
appropriately. The coalition has requested
enhanced oversight of the interagency commodity
jurisdiction process to ensure it correctly and
consistently follows existing regulations, and
clarifying guidelines on the proper use of
regulations and interagency input during the
evaluation process.
The coalition is mindful that piecemeal
improvements to the existing system will not
allow it to effectively address the security and
economic challenges and opportunities of the 21st
century. For this reason, the coalition has begun
discussing and identifying the key elements of a
“model modern system” to compare with the
existing system. The best long-term solution to
addressing the negative impact of export controls
on U.S. security and economic interests would be
adopting key elements of this model system to
better evaluate rationally, precisely, and
efficiently the risks and rewards of U.S.
technology exports.
The Changing Face and Fate of Export
Controls
For years, export controls have been something of
a “black art” in Washington, DC. Understood by
few and misunderstood by many, the laws and
regulations designed to keep sensitive U.S.
technology in responsible hands have evolved
15
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See 26 February 2007, The Space Review, article
by Jeff Foust.

See

www.securityandcompetitiveness.org/proposals/show/2241.
html (accessed 5 December 2007).
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slowly, while the global market for aerospace and
the need for strong military alliances have
flourished. Export control laws still remain
arcane, but the potential for modernization is
emerging on the horizon.
Through history, export controls were something
one entity visited upon another. Whether it was
the U.S. Congress placing restrictions on the
administration, the administration on industry, or
any one country on another, export controls have
never been rooted in open political dialogue. That
has changed noticeably in recent years, and the
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness has
expanded this dialogue through consultations at
all levels of the interagency process and visits
with almost every office of every member of the
congressional committees of jurisdiction.
The administration welcomed the launch of the
Coalition for Security and Competitiveness in
March of 2007 and has spent the last few months
reviewing its proposals. By end of 2007, assuming
successful completion of the interagency review
process and the absence of major opposition from
congress, the administration will likely announce
its plans to move forward on a number of
coalition recommendations to make the U.S.
export control system more predictable, efficient,
and transparent.
The administration also recently proposed defense
trade treaties with the United Kingdom (UK) and
Australia that would reduce impediments to
technology trade with those countries, while
maintaining stringent security standards.16 The
outreach and ongoing dialogue by the
administration has recently ramped up, and the
resulting reception from congress has been warm.
As the experience of the U.S.-UK treaty indicates,

16

U.S.-UK
Treaty
text
available
at
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/90740.htm, and U.S.Australia
Treaty
text
available
at
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/91763.htm
(both
accessed 15 December 2007).

congress is now more willing than ever to
consider new concepts in export control.17
Perhaps, the most compelling reason for this shift
in congressional opinion is that the underlying
justifications of export control have changed.
America only benefits from its technological edge
by sharing it prudently and can only sustain that
edge by honing it with the innovations and
contributions of our military allies and trading
partners. Determining which countries and users
get which pieces of that technology should vary
not only according to their need, but also
according to their demonstrated ability to protect
what they get. The U.S. default position should
hold that responsible states who work and fight
alongside the U.S. should also benefit, when
practical, from U.S. technology.
Another evolution is evident in who has been
advocating for modernization of export controls.
Traditionally, the high-technology defense
industry has been interested in export control
because its products were most likely to be
controlled. With global markets opening, though,
that industry has been joined by representatives of
The U.S.-UK treaty referenced here deals with
defense trade cooperation. This treaty permits the
export of certain U.S. defense articles and services
to the UK Government and select British
companies that meet specific requirements,
without U.S. export licenses or other prior
approvals. It also ensures the continuation of the
British policy of not requiring a license for the
export of UK defense articles and services to the
U.S. The Treaty will create an approved
community of the two governments and selected
defense companies. Most U.S. defense articles
will be eligible to be exported into and within this
community without prior U.S. Government
licenses or other authorizations as long as the
exports are in support of: combined U.S.-UK
military or counterterrorism operations; joint
U.S.-UK cooperative security and defense
research, development, production, and support
programs; specific security and defense projects
that are for UK government use only; and U.S.
government end-use. See U.S.-UK Treaty text at
www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/90740.htm.
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every sector of American business. The Coalition
for Security and Competitiveness brings together
technology businesses as diverse as the National
Association of Manufacturers and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, who represent every
sector of the economy.
U.S. businesses have woken up to the extent to
which outdated export control provisions hinder
America’s ability to compete in the global
marketplace. They have seen technologies widely
available from competitors prosper, while we
restrict U.S. companies from exporting
functionally similar items. They see the reality of
globalization in all facets of modern business and
the
pervasiveness
of
high-performance
technologies in such transactions. In short,
industry needs fewer licenses on no-risk and
lowest-risk exports, with necessary licenses
approved quickly enough to get the job done.

The U.S., and those joining the industrial push for
export control modernization, is buoyed by the
mounting recognition that improvements to the
system will not interfere with legitimate national
security concerns.18 Dialogue among the agencies,
congress and the industry remains critical. In the
absence of such a dialogue, it would be easy to
mistakenly assume that common ground in
seeking to address the risks associated with
technology exchange is not sought. Export
controls have traditionally been about denying the
“bad guys” any access to the “good stuff.” That
has to remain a core value. But, it is also more
important than ever to make sure that the “good
guys” have a pipeline to the “good stuff” and,
when possible, that the “good stuff” is coming
from U.S. manufacturers.

Future discussions on export controls, commercial
satellites, and the space industrial base, spurred by
effective government studies, should take lessons
from the success of the Coalition for Security and
Competitiveness. The coalition’s proposals for
export modernization focus on the crux of the
issue: increasing predictability, efficiency, and
transparency in the current system. The aerospace
and defense industry is not looking to “decontrol” exports irrespective of legitimate national
security concerns, but merely to add speed and
consistency to the process.
In the near-term, this can be done by increasing
resources for export licensing agencies and
finding more efficient ways to manage the risk of
technology exchange. In the long-term, the
challenge of increasing political resources,
particularly oversight of policies and regulations,
to ensure the quality and consistency of licensing
and commodity jurisdiction decisions must be
addressed. America’s foreign allies also play a
role by recognizing that, to maximize the security
and economic benefits of technology exchange
with the U.S., they must accommodate and
address legitimate security concerns.

18

Baker Spring, A Step Forward in Reforming the
United States Arms Export Control Process, 9
April 2007 (accessed at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/NationalSecurity/wm1416.cfm).
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Final Report Summary, August 2007

This report focuses on the health and
competitiveness of the United States (U.S.) Space
Industrial Base, including the associated impacts
of U.S. export controls. The Department of
Defense, through the Under Secretary of the Air
Force and the Space Industrial Base Council
directed this study. An Air Force Research
Laboratory, Materials and Manufacturing
Directorate representative led an industrygovernment team and integrated the information
gathered to prepare the study. The Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
developed and deployed the survey instrument
and verified data provided by companies
comprising the U.S. Space Industry. Team
contractor support included the Universal
Technology Corporation, Booz Allen Hamilton,
The Tauri Group, Nortel Government Solutions
which operates the Air Force Industrial Base
Information Center, and Northrop Grumman
Technical Services.
Executive Summary
In October 2006, the National Security Space
Office (NSSO) initiated this space industrial base
assessment. The purpose was to assess the health,
competitiveness, and ability of the space industrial
base to continue support of national security space
requirements. Specifically, the goals were to: (1)
evaluate the industrial, economic, and financial
factors affecting the U.S. Space Industrial Base;
(2) determine if U.S. export controls and practices
are impacting space prime contractors and 2nd / 3rd
tier subcontractors; and (3) develop findings and
conclusions for the Space Industrial Base Council.
A team approach was taken to conduct the study.
The government team project lead and integrator
was the Air Force Research Laboratory Materials
and Manufacturing Directorate (Industrial Base
Program). The Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Industry and Security (BIS) developed,
deployed, and verified data collection from a

survey of space industry companies, and the
NSSO served in an oversight capacity.
The study involved a broad look at industrial base
indicators and a detailed analysis of the BIS
survey inputs. The BIS issued the survey
electronically on 2 February 2007 and concluded
it on 24 April 24 2007. The survey was sent to
274 space industry company/business units— the
BIS received and verified 202 survey inputs for a
74% response rate. The team used tier levels
aligned by typical business supply chain hierarchy
to characterize the industry respondents. Prime
contractors were Tier 1, subcontractors were Tier
2, and commodity suppliers were Tier 3. The
study focused on three analysis streams including
Global Marketplace / Competitiveness, U.S.
Industry Health, and Export Control Impacts.
Global Marketplace and Competitiveness
Foreign competition is real and growing.
Moreover, there is some evidence that U.S. export
controls give foreign competitors a perceived
advantage in marketing to non-U.S. customers.
Segments of the U.S. space industry feel
threatened competitively and see export controls
as the main factor undermining their ability to
compete for sales in foreign markets.
Sales and Market Share
Total global and total U.S. space sales have
increased, mostly in services, for the 2003-2006
period surveyed. However, the U.S. share of the
global market decreased. For example, the U.S.
share of satellite manufacturing has decreased
20% for all commercial communication satellites
(COMSATs) sales and 10% for geosynchronous
orbit COMSATs since 1999. Defense funding,
domestic non-defense services, and ground
equipment dominate U.S. space industry sales.
Export sales represent less than 10% of total U.S.
company revenues annually from 2003-2006.
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Competition
Industry’s view on its competitiveness in the
2008–2012 timeframe is very positive with regard
to the domestic market. In the foreign
marketplace, there is a broad industry consensus
on the difficulty in capturing sales. Industry
identified strong foreign competition in spacecraft
manufacturing, primarily in Europe, followed by
the Asia-Pacific region. Companies also indicated
U.S. export control requirements were the number
one barrier to selling in foreign markets, followed
by indigenous purchase preferences.

reported loss of foreign sales due to ITAR was
$2.35 billion, mainly due to lengthy processing
times. The average processing time for Technical
Assistance Agreements has grown to over three
months.
Cost of Compliance
Export control compliance costs averaged $49
million per year industry-wide. Compliance costs
grew 37% during the 2003–2006 period with the
burden of compliance significantly higher for
firms in the lower tiers.
Unintended Consequences

United States Industry Health
Overall, financial viability for the U.S. space
industry is good based on publicly available
company annual reports, with 70% of the
companies considered at low risk. Twenty-five
percent of the companies were considered at
moderate or high risk (primarily commercial
space services and manufacturers of materials for
launch systems). Aggregate Research and
Development expenditures grew an average of 8%
per year since 2003, primarily in Tiers 2 and 3 as
an investment in innovation by firms to remain
competitive. The space workforce has grown 22%
over the last 4 years.
Export Control Impacts
The industry survey captured information related
to the added financial and labor costs associated
with export sales, as well as, trends tied to
processing International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) and Export Administration
Regulations licenses. This analysis addressed
process issues, cost of compliance, the unintended
consequences of export controls, and suggested
industry remedies.
License Process Issues
Impacts of export control processes vary by tier
with more pronounced impacts at lower tiers.
Although less than 1% of ITAR license
applications were denied from 2003–2006, the

Foreign competitors leveraged their countries’
more relaxed regulatory climate in marketing their
products as “ITAR-free”— purportedly directly
affecting U.S. companies’ ability to compete.
Some U.S. companies claimed the European
Space Agency (ESA) directed European
companies to find non-U.S. sources for space
products, and ESA has also funded development
of competing products to either avoid ITAR
requirements, develop indigenous capabilities, or
both.
Industry Remedies
Almost 60% of the recommended industry actions
were to update U.S. export control lists more
often to accurately reflect current global
technology and the competitive environment.
Nearly 23% of respondents recommended specific
actions for streamlining the U.S. export control
licensing process. Some firms also made
recommendations to reform the Congressional
review process.
Findings and Conclusions
The U.S. space industry has, in general, been
healthy for the 2003-2006 period and very
competitive domestically for both defense and
commercial products and services; however, the
global space market has changed significantly
since 1998-1999 when the U.S. Government made
major modifications to its overall export control
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regulations for space-related products and
services. The U.S. industry now faces strong and
growing competition, primarily from European
firms, and is losing market share in allied
countries. Reportedly, ITAR has impacted U.S.
competitiveness by encouraging other nations, in
many cases our allies, to develop indigenous
space capabilities and industries that now market
globally.
Survey respondents reported that ITAR changes
and the cost of export control compliance have
directly or indirectly precipitated this increased
competition. To maintain and enhance the U.S.
position in the global space market, ITAR
processes need to be frequently reviewed and
adjusted, as appropriate. ITAR staffing at the U.S.
Department of State and the Department of
Defense’s
Defense
Technology
Security
Administration should be reviewed and adjusted
to ensure that personnel/funding levels align with
the number of applications processed. Moreover,
restrictions regarding sales to U.S. allies should be
re-examined to reflect geopolitical and economic
considerations.
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President Issues Export Controls Directive
Reform United States Defense Trade Policies and Practices, 22 January 2008

President Bush issued an Export Control Directive
today that will ensure that United States (U.S.)
defense trade policies and practices better support
the National Security Strategy. The package of
reforms required under this directive will improve
the manner in which the U.S. Department of State
licenses the export of defense equipment, services
and technical data, enabling the U.S. Government
to respond more expeditiously to the military
equipment needs of our friends, allies, and
particularly our coalition partners.
The Export Control Directive mandates the
commitment of additional financial and other
resources, as well as procedural reforms that will
expedite the processing of export license
applications for items controlled by the U.S.
Munitions List. Although license processing times
will be reduced as a result of this directive, the
Administration is committed to ensuring that
existing measures to prevent the diversion of such
items to unauthorized recipients remain strong
and effective.

•
•
•

•

resulted in a nearly 50 percent reduction since
April 2007 in the number of export license
applications pending with the Department of
State.
The electronic licensing system will be
upgraded to permit the submission of all types
of defense trade licenses and to enable all
agencies to access the same electronic
information.
The Secretary of State will update U.S.
controls on exports involving dual and third
country nationals from NATO and other allied
countries.

A More Efficient Dispute Resolution Mechanism
•

The specific actions directed by the President are
listed below.

A formal interagency dispute mechanism will
be created to allow for timely resolution of
licensing jurisdiction issues involving the
Departments of State and Commerce under
the Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) process. The
National Security Council will also undertake
a review to make sure the CJ process is
efficient and timely.
Enhanced Enforcement

More Effective U.S. Export Licensing
•
•

•

Additional financial resources and intelligence
support will be made available for the timely
adjudication of defense trade licenses.
Guidelines will be issued that require a
decision by the U.S. Government on defense
trade export license applications within 60
days, absent a strong reason for additional
time, such as a requirement for Congressional
notification. Initial efforts in this regard have

A multi-agency working group will be
established to improve procedures for
conducting export enforcement investigations.

The directive reflects consensus recommendations
from the National Security Council and the
Departments of State and Defense. The Bush
Administration is committed to working closely
with U.S. industry to implement these reforms.
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Program Annals 2007

National Space Forum:
Towards a Theory of Spacepower
Summer Space Seminar
China Working Group:
China, Space, and Strategy
Future of Space Commerce Workshop:
Reducing Risks and Fostering Partnerships –
Synergies between Civil, Military, Commercial, and New Space
Space Based Solar Power Workshop
Improving Our Vision II:
Building Transparency and Cooperation –
Workshop on Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing
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National Space Forum 2007: Towards a Theory of Spacepower
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Colorado Springs, Colorado, January 2007
Charles D. Lutes

Senior Military Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies
The Spacepower Theory Project seeks to gain
insight into human behavior in outer space. The
project’s overall objective is to develop a
theoretical framework that helps to define,
categorize, explain and anticipate ways in which
“spacepower” may be pursued, how the various
facets of spacepower connect to each other, and
how they relate to the other instrumentalities of
power that state and non-state actors may seek to
achieve or retain.
Since 1957, spacepower has evolved from the first
space age, where prestige was a primary
motivation of activity, to the second (current)
space age where the primary commodity of space
is information. The next space age may well be
defined by the creation of wealth in space and
other celestial bodies. Throughout these phases,
outer space activities provide a means for
enhancing sociocultural, economic, and political
power.
To reach the potential promise of space in these
areas requires serious attention to the security
aspects of the space domain. Security in space
could be maximized by a situation in which
unfettered access by spacefaring actors becomes a
norm for amicable interstate relations; where such
actors achieve a measure of protection against the
aggressive or capricious acts of spoilers; and
where real or perceived vulnerabilities among
space actors are minimized. Creating a condition
of enduring stability in outer space will depend
upon how tensions between national interests are
addressed and whether there emerges over time a
convergent perception of what actions tend, on
balance, to strengthen or undermine stability.

The National Defense University’s Institute for
National Strategic Studies (INSS) is conducting a
study that seeks to develop a theory of
spacepower– that is, a conceptual framework for
explicating the fundamental aspects of
spacepower and its relation to the pursuit of
national security, economic, informational, and
scientific objectives in a fashion that provides
insight into the behavior of spacefaring actors.
The project takes into account the views and
perspectives of the principal users of space, and it
attempts to assess the underlying assumptions
regarding why and how a society, a nation, or a
non-state actor might use space– either alone or,
more likely, in tandem with other means– to
accomplish specific ends. The resultant theory
will provide policy specialists and space
professionals from any nation– whether in the
national security, civil, or commercial space
sectors– with an intellectual foundation upon
which to assess the conduct and impact of spacerelated activities. This paper outlines initial
insights generated by the project and serves as a
vehicle for eliciting feedback from United States
(U.S.) and international stakeholders.
Through a series of seminars, workshops, and
conferences, which includes a National Space
Forum on the topic held in 2007 that was
sponsored by INSS and the Eisenhower Center for
Spacer and Defense Studies at the U.S. Air Force
Academy, experts in the global space community
provided and exchanged a rich set of viewpoints,
ideas, and theories in an ongoing dialogue.
Additionally, the Spacepower Theory Project
team traveled to Japan, China, and India to
capture views in a region of burgeoning space
competition. The insights in this update will be
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refined into a concise monograph for distribution
among the space and policy communities.
Additionally, the project team is in the final
editing stages of a book length manuscript that
was discussed at the National Space Forum
mentioned above. The book contains thirty
chapters, which are listed below, by various
expert authors commissioned for this project. This
book will be published by National Defense
University Press (or a commercial press) in 2008.
1. Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics
2. Introduction to Spacepower Theory
3. On the Nature of Theory
4. International Relations Theory and
Spacepower
5. Old Thoughts, New Problems: Mahan and the
Conception of Spacepower
6. Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower
7. Orbital Terrain and Space Physics
8. Space Law and Governance Structures
9. Building on Previous Spacepower Theory
10. History of Commercial Space Activity and
Spacepower
11. Commercial Space Industry and Markets
12. Merchants and Guardians
13. Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space
14. History of Civil Space Activity and
Spacepower
15. Affordable and Responsive Space Systems
16. Competing Visions for Exploration
17. Spacepower and the Environment
18. History of Security Space Activity and
Spacepower
19. Increasing the Military Uses of Space
20. Preserving Freedom of Action in Space
21. Balancing Security Interests
22. Russia
23. China
24. Europe
25. Emerging Actors
26. Evolving United States Structures
27. U.S. Military Power: Conceptual
Underpinnings and Practice
28. Technological Drivers
29. Building Human Capital for Spacepower
30. The Future of Spacepower

These works can only begin to capture a fraction
of the thinking in the space community today and
should be considered snapshots of progress
towards developing a theory. This will not be a
definitive work; the theory should be a living
document that continues to evolve and progress
with the human experience of space. Ultimately,
this project is less about space itself, but rather
about human, state, and societal behavior and
their relationships to the space domain.
Developing a Theory of Spacepower
The overarching scope and definition of this
spacepower theory requires a strategic perspective
that transcends purely military, economic,
political, or nationalistic perspectives. This theory
strives to do the following things:
• Define what spacepower is, what it is not, and
what makes it unique in order to provide a
common lexicon for all space actors.
• Categorize the elements, constituent parts, and
factors that yield a framework for thinking
about spacepower.
• Explain the ways in which spacepower has
exhibited during its short history.
• Connect elements within spacepower and to
other means of national power.
• Anticipate potential ways in which
spacepower might be used in the future.
A theory of spacepower should not be confused
with a policy, strategy, or doctrine, though it may
inform such efforts. Although written primarily
from the perspective of the U.S., it is not intended
to suggest specific courses of action for the U.S.
or any other specific actor. The basic principles of
the theory should be applicable across a broad
range of space actors.
The development of spacepower theory can be
related to the development of sea power theory by
Alfred T. Mahan in his work The Influence of Sea
Power Upon History, 1660-1783.1 Mahan
addressed the importance of economic trade to the
1

A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History, 1660-1783, 14th ed., (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1898).
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prosperity of the American nation and the
implications for maritime and naval activity in the
advancement of this prosperity. He addressed the
essence of sea power primarily through a
historical lens by looking at the nature of the
maritime activity of great powers in history.
Writing from the perspective of what could be
considered a second-tier naval power at the time,
i.e., the U.S.; he drew important lessons for
creating American economic strength by
advancing its attention to sea power. A
“Mahanian theory” for spacepower should
consider the role of space activity in relation to
the larger strategic and international environment.

•

Spacepower theory, it should be stressed, is not a
military theory. It is a strategic theory based upon
human activity as applied to the space domain.
Although the historical evidence for space activity
is limited, theorizing about human behavior in a
variety of disciplines provides a sufficient base
upon which to draw. Theories of science,
philosophy, human nature, politics, economics,
and geopolitics have been incorporated in addition
to theories of war and other military theories.

Just as the Cold War was the defining context for
the first space age, the fall of the Soviet Union
and an era of U.S. unipolarity defined the second
or “American space age.” This space age
continues to be the dominant feature of the current
space environment. This shift was exemplified by
the 1991 Gulf War, sometimes referred to as the
“first space war.” The predominant features of
this space age include:

A Short History of Spacepower
Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the world has
seen two identifiable space “ages,” each distinct
in its significance and influence on human affairs.
A much longer pre-space age saw technological
advancements enable the fulfillment of once
fanciful visions of space travel and exploration.
This rich history of space offer signposts that
point to potential space ages of the future.

•
•

A public civil competition to explore nearearth space and ultimately the Moon.
A (largely) hidden military and intelligence
competition for strategic advantage.
A slowly developing economic enterprise.

The primary commodity of the first space age was
prestige. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S.
viewed their space programs through the larger
geostrategic competition. The prestige associated
with the civil space programs afforded a new type
of moral power to both nations as they vied to
establish dominance of their cultural, political,
and economic systems.

•

•

•

The rise of globalization, with greatly
increased communications and information
flows, enabled by the global perspective of
satellite technology.
A shift in military emphasis from gaining
strategic advantage in space to gaining
operational and tactical advantage in terrestrial
warfare.
A precipitous decline in the former emphasis
on civil space.

The first space age, from 1957 to 1991, is often
associated with the shorthand term “the space
race.” Space activity became a microcosm of the
global geostrategic environment that defined the
era. The imperatives of the bi-polar Cold War
accelerated the advancement of space technology
and activities in space. For both the Soviet Union
and the U.S., this competition played out in
several important ways:

The primary commodity of the second space age
has been information. While some new players
entered the space arena to enhance their prestige,
advanced spacefaring actors developed and used
space to enable the transition into the
“information age.” Today’s emphasis on
information in space has greatly enhanced the
military, economic, and political power of those
actors, with the U.S. as the dominant power in the
space-enabled information area.

A geostrategic competition to showcase
technological, economic, and military power.

It is unclear what the dominant features of the
next space age will be or when it will definitively

•
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occur. Shifting features in the geopolitical context
suggest that the shift to the next space age will
occur within the scope of this theory (i.e., within
the next 50 years). These features (to be explored
in more detail in an additional section in the final
report of this project) include a shift away from
the unipolarity of today’s international system to a
multipolar environment with a much broader and
more diverse set of actors. As power is diffused
among these actors, the nature of power in space
will begin to change. Potential features of the next
space age might include:
•
•
•

Great technological advancements which
significantly lower the barriers to entry for
potential spacefaring actors.
Shift from a geocentric perspective to a solar
system perspective.
Renewed strategic competition in space.

A primary commodity of the next space age may
well be wealth. The dominant paradigm in space
could become an economic one, as activities in
space shift from enabling wealth creation on Earth
to that of wealth creation in space. The economic
value of space is currently but a small fraction of
its potential. Beyond the impact space has in
supporting earthly economic enterprises, the next
space age will be marked by a boom in the
economic value of space itself. Alvin and Heidi
Toffler have suggested that the development of
wealth creation in space would be revolutionary
and signify a “fourth wave” of human
development.2
A brief look at the history of space activity
suggests that humans go to space for a variety of
reasons: geopolitical, military, economic,
scientific, and human destiny. Regardless of the
reasons for going to space, such activity conveys a
variety of benefits to spacefaring actors: prestige;
military advantage; economic competitiveness;
and scientific prowess. Benefits accrued to the
larger society have included: the advancement of
scientific knowledge; stimulation of global
economic activity; enhanced communications and
2

Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Revolutionary Wealth
(New York: Alred A. Knopf, 2006).

information flows; and awareness of the global
environment.
The Nature of Spacepower
Power is perhaps the most important yet illdefined concept in the study of politics and
international relations. Power is often associated
with the specific instrument through which it is
manifested such as economic, diplomatic,
informational, economic, or military power.
Major dimensions of power focus on how it is
created,
increased,
decreased,
stored,
communicated, used, and measured. A key
consideration is whether power is fungible, or
easily transferable, between dissimilar instruments
such as diplomatic and military power. Most
dimensions of politics and international relations
revolve around how states and other actors use
power.
This study builds from Joseph Nye’s simple
definition of power as “the ability to achieve
one’s purposes or goals.”3 It is therefore a natural
extrapolation to define spacepower as “the ability
to use space to achieve one’s purposes or goals.”
In a further expansion of the definition of power,
Nye suggests that it is the ability to influence
others that creates this power. While that is true
for spacepower, space capabilities may also be
able to influence natural events as well as human
behavior. An expanded definition of spacepower
could then be derived as “the ability to use space
to influence others, events, or the environment to
achieve one’s purposes or goals.”
In an increasingly complex and globalizing
society, there are five important types of power:4
3

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History
(New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005).
4
See Sean Kay, Global Security in the TwentyFirst Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2006). Kay identifies these as state
power; soft power; asymmetrical power; people,
ideas, and information power; and the power of
nature.
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•

•

•

Hard power. The classic application of power
by state actors consists of the ability to use
inducements or coercion through military,
economic, or diplomatic applications.
Spacepower contributes to an actor’s hard
power by providing military and intelligence
capabilities to threaten an adversary’s
terrestrial or space-based activities.
Soft power. This concerns the overall
attractiveness of an actor to others to attain its
goals without threats or use of force. This
“attractive power” is attained by setting the
example and getting others to emulate
favorable behavior. Spacepower provides
prestige, technical and educational prowess,
economic incentives, and cooperative ventures
as means for enhancing soft power.
Asymmetrical power. The acceleration of
globalization has created a diffusion of power
that allows weak actors to challenge strong or
dominate actors in asymmetric ways.
Spacepower tends to be dominated by stronger
actors, but can be threatened asymmetrically
by weaker actors through means such as
Hard
Power

Soft
Power

•

•

kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs),
jamming, or attacks on ground facilities.
Power of ideas. The diffusion of power from
states down to the individual has occurred
through the ubiquitous availability of
information and ideas. Such power can either
weaken or strengthen a state, society, or
political system depending on the context.
Spacepower plays a great role in the
transmission of this type of power through
communication,
remote
sensing,
and
navigation applications.
Power of nature. Nature itself wields power
that can present security challenges. The
power of humankind to mitigate or avoid the
ravages due to natural disasters, pandemics,
climate change, or collision by near-Earth
objects is enhanced by spacepower
capabilities.

Spacepower contributes to all of these forms of
power, including sociocultural power, economic
power, and security power (see Figure below).

Asymmetrical
Power

Power of
Ideas

Power of
Nature

Spacepower

Socio-Cultural
Spacepower

Economic
Spacepower

Definitions
Developing and applying a comprehensive and
consistent set of definitions and categories are
essential steps towards building spacepower

Security
Spacepower

theory. In addition to the discussion of power and
spacepower above, key terms for this study
include:
• Space. There is no universally accepted
definition of space or outer space. Disputes
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over sovereignty, the inability to precisely
describe a spatial demarcation, need to distinguish
from laws regarding airspace and other legal
issues have stymied the development of an
accepted definition. There has been a sort
customary law that has developed to the effect
that any object in orbit is considered to be in
space.5 For the purposes of this study space begins
when objects are able to achieve positions in
stable orbits around the Earth or beyond. With
current technology, this would describe space as
beginning at an altitude of approximately 69 miles
(and above the accepted end of aerodynamic
limits, the von Karman jurisdiction line, which is
approximately 55-62 miles in altitude).

domain both constrains and enables human ability
to utilize space for specific applications.
Technology is used to overcome these limitations
but is itself constrained by costs and the state of
scientific development. The appropriate resources
to include wealth, access to materials, and
industrial capacity are essential. The political and
cultural environments within and among nations
also determine the level of interest and
motivations for developing space programs.
Finally, governance issues, particularly with
regard to international laws and regimes, play a
role in determining the path of spacepower. In
considering these shaping factors, some
implications can be derived:

Astrographic. Everett Dolman provides a useful
astrographic delineation of space into four
regions: (1) terra (Earth and space to a point just
below sustained, unpowered orbit); (2) terran
space (lowest viable orbit to just beyond
geostationary altitude); (3) lunar space (just
beyond geostationary orbit to just beyond lunar
orbit); and (4) solar space (everything else in the
solar system).6

Spacepower is unique because it can operate both
in relation to earth activity and independent of it.

•

•

Spacefaring. Spacefaring is “the ability to do
something in space.” Spacefaring activities are
“activities conducted in space.” Spacefaring
actors are “state and non-state actors engaged
in spacefaring.” Spacefaring actors conduct
spacefaring activities through indigenous
production, collaborative efforts, or third party
purchase of space systems or services.
Space Industrial Base. The space industrial
base includes “those elements of industry and
education that contribute to spacefaring.”
Shaping Factors

An actor’s spacepower capability is shaped by in
variety of ways. The physical nature of the
5

Glen H. Reynolds and Robert P. Merges, Outer
Space: Problems of Law and Policy, (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1998).
6
Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical
Geopolitics in the Space Age, (London: Frank
Cass Publishers, 2002).

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Certain physical phenomena in space (e.g.,
gravity wells, libration points, predictable
Earth orbits) can provide strategic advantage
(and disadvantage) to space powers.
Technology eventually lowers costs.
Space technology can be single or multi-use.
Maintaining the space infrastructure and an
industrial base is not a free good.
Political will is required for the long haul.
Non-state actors may be hampered by
domestic regulations, laws, and political
constraints.
A spacefaring culture includes both technical
prowess and ambition.
Forms of Spacepower

Almost all space activities can normally be placed
into just one of the following sectors: civil,
commercial, military, or intelligence activities.
However, growth in commercial space activity,
the increasing number of dual-use space systems,
and digital convergence can also make it
increasingly difficult to categorize certain space
activities neatly into one of these sectors. Many
spacefaring actors have separate government
organizations dedicated primarily to performing
only the activities within one of these sectors. For
the purposes of this study, the military and
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intelligence activities will be considered as a
single sector, the national security space sector.

are evident. A few insights from this section
include:

Spacefaring actors include those operating at the
surprastate, transnational, state, and substate
levels. This raises a “levels of analysis” problem
that makes consistent categorization and
comparisons difficult. By considering an actor’s
level of activity across the three spacepower
sectors described in the previous section, a set of
archetype space actors can be fairly described as
follows:

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

Comprehensive space powers have robust,
indigenous space capabilities that provide
significant benefits through space operations
in all space activity sectors: commercial, civil,
and security. They have indigenous capacity
to manufacture, launch, and operate space
systems.
Emerging space powers are those actors
actively developing their capabilities in all
three sectors of space activity. They may still
be developing capacity in certain areas, but
are progressing toward comprehensive
capability.
Niche spacefaring actors have chosen not to
develop comprehensive space capabilities or
do not (yet) have the intent or resources or
required to develop such capabilities.
Consortia, such as the European Space
Agency (ESA) or the partners in the ongoing
International Space Station (ISS) effort
undertake many space activities.
Space entrepreneurs are pursuing a range of
new private space ventures such as space
tourism or space mining activity.
Free riders are space beneficiaries that use at
least some product or service created by
spacefaring activity. Due to growth in the
efficacy and ubiquity of spacefaring activity,
these space beneficiaries comprise a very
broad category that includes nearly every
actor in the modern world.

In describing spacepower, the unique aspects of
space as an operating environment and of
spacefaring activity as a set of human endeavors

•

•

Metaphors from other domains, sea, air, and
land, do not necessarily apply.
Perspectives and motivations vary among
actors, categories of actors, and among
sectors. Consider the primary drivers in each
of the space sectors: civil space as destiny and
discovery driven; commercial space that is
profit driven; and security space, which is
threat driven.
Harmonization among space actors, categories
of actors, and among sectors is difficult to
achieve.
Spacepower and the International System

Spacepower has an emerging role in the
international political system, and at the same
time the nature of that system influences how
actors might perceive and use spacepower.
Spacepower to date was shaped primarily by the
Cold War context in which it matured. As the
international system exhibits changes over the
next fifty years, the nature of spacepower can be
expected to change with it.
Realist and Liberal Perspectives
Associating the word power with space activity
connotes in many a realist interpretation of human
behavior, yet both the realist and liberal
perspectives are present in those advocating and
developing spacepower strategies. It is useful to
consider varying assumptions that might affect an
actor’s notion about the role of spacepower in the
international system. The table below briefly
highlights some of these assumptions and
prescriptions generally associated with traditional
realist and liberal perspectives.7
7

This chart was derived from a number of sources.
See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001);
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History
(New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005); Hans
Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, Seeing the
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While certainly there are more complex
explanations of the international system, this
simplistic look at the two major perspectives goes
a long way to understanding the tension points in
many spacepower debates. The realist would tend
to view space as another domain for great power
competition, and ultimately conflict. The liberal
view in its most progressive form sees space as a
venue for the evolution of the human species to a
higher order destiny; but at a minimum holds that
maintaining space as a sanctuary provides the best
guarantee of stability in space.

Realism

Liberalism

Assumptions about human
behavior:

Pessimistic

Optimistic

Unit of analysis:

Individual states

International system

Principal actors in international
system:

States exclusively; great power states
primarily

State behavior determined by:

External power calculations

States primarily, but increasingly
diverse set of supra- and subnational actors
Internal characteristics

Modern world affairs driven
mainly by:

Security competition

Democratization and economic
growth

The main goals of foreign policy
should be:

Increasing power to guarantee
security and survival

Democracy and economic growth

The primary instrument is:

Hard power

Soft power

Concerned with:

Relative gain (zero-sum)

Absolute gain (mutual benefits)

International system should be
optimized to provide:

Security

Stability

Treaties, alliances, and
international institutions merit:

Less faith

Strong support

Interdependence creates:

Vulnerabilities

Opportunities for cooperation

Best chances of success in world
affairs comes from:

Benign hegemony by a great power
acting as a Leviathan

Liberal democracies working
together multilaterally

Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security,
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006); and
Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-First
Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2006).
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These competing viewpoints vie for influence in the decision processes of spacepower actors. Applying the
realist and liberal lenses to spacepower yields the following insights shown in the next table.
Realism

Liberalism

Human behavior in space:

Will mirror human behavior on Earth

Can transcend terrestrial disputes

Principal actors in space:

Spacefaring states

Spacefaring states; consortia; nonstate entities; private enterprise

State behavior in space
determined by:

Power calculations

Domestic goals and needs

Spacepower optimized for:

Security

Stability

Spacepower is maximized
through:

Space dominance

Space as a sanctuary

Space as a venue is inherently:

Competitive

Cooperative

Rules sets should guarantee:

Freedom of access

Common heritage of mankind;
peaceful uses of outer space

Means to achieve:

Space control

Legal frameworks

Interdependence in space
creates:

Vulnerabilities; cascading effects

Opportunities for cooperation;
stability

The Current Paradigm of Spacepower in the
International System
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty defined the initial
principles for space activity and these principles
describe the dominant paradigm of the
international community regarding spacepower:8
• Space is the province of all mankind– a
“global commons.”
• Space is to be used for peaceful purposes.
• All states have an equal right to explore and
use space.
• International cooperation and consultation are
essential.
• Signatories retain ownership of their space
objects and bear responsibility for their space

activities, including and damage inflicted on
another state’s space objects.
Although most, if not all, spacefaring actors
ascribe to the principles of the Outer Space
Treaty, a number of issues have arisen to
challenge the dominant paradigm:
•

•

•
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 27
January 1967; entered into force October 10,
1967.
8

•

Definitional problems. The terms “peaceful
uses” and “common heritage of mankind”
have widely varying interpretations among
space actors.
Sovereignty and property rights. Economic
development in space under the current
paradigm is stunted by lack of legal definition
concerning these issues.
Prospects of weapons in space. Concerns
over possible deployments of ASATs and
space-based missile defense systems present
serious problems for those desiring space to
retain a “weapons-free” status.
Pursuit of self-interests. As more actors enter
into the space domain, there may be a growing
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Enhancing the International System

tendency to pursue unilateral interests rather
than adhere to established norms.
International Security in Space
The space political environment is still in its
infancy, and it is unclear how the balance between
purely national and global interests will be
managed. A reframing of the current paradigm
may be required to accommodate the changing
nature of space activity. States will likely seek
alternative arrangements in space as they perceive
greater security vulnerability. Some alternative
ways that states may choose to enhance security
or stability, either individually or collectively,
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pursue unilateral strategies.
Apply a balance of power approach.
Develop alliance-based security arrangements.
Establish “rules of the road.”
Establish frameworks for cooperation and
interdependence in space.
Negotiate arms control or other legal
restraints.

From the standpoint of international security, one
can identify an optimal condition of enduring
stability in the space domain. Its attributes would
include:
•
•
•

A norm of unfettered access to space as a
feature of amicable inter-state relations.
A solid measure of protection, through
individual or collective measures, against the
aggressive or capricious acts of spoilers.
A situation in which the real or perceived
vulnerabilities among space actors are
minimized.

Ultimately, creating a condition of enduring
stability in outer space will hinge upon how
tensions between national interests are addressed
and whether there emerges over time a convergent
perception of what actions tend, on balance, to
strengthen or undermine stability. If enduring
stability is not the primary goal of major space
powers, then the prospects for military
competition and conflict will increase.

In a stable environment, space can enhance and
strengthen the international system. The economic
and sociocultural imperatives discussed earlier
suggest the importance of maintaining space as a
domain for wealth creation and for solving
problems of humankind. Spacefaring actors
should consider adopting cooperative approaches
in space to address some of issues of global
concern:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Energy scarcity.
Global climate change.
Space situational awareness.
Space debris.
Defense against Earth colliding objects.
Material resource scarcity.
Extra-terrestrial property regimes.

The ability to forge collective action on these and
other issues will enhance understanding,
confidence building, and sharing of knowledge
that will contribute to the stability of space as a
regime and to its effectiveness in enhancing
human prosperity.
Sociocultural Spacepower
Space has been described as a “global commons,”
a term which suggests a medium or domain that
exists for the common good of all. Global
commons are “natural assets outside national
jurisdiction, such as the oceans, outer space, and
the Antarctic.”9 There is no international standard
as to what constitutes a global commons, and
consideration of such varies widely. In addition to
the oceans, outer space, and the Antarctic, some
areas that are considered include: the atmosphere,
telecommunications (electromagnetic spectrum),
information, culture, and the environment. The
idea that space would remain a province for
cooperation is based on two interrelated principles
that have been established as international norms:
9

Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in
Methods, Series F, No. 67, (New York: United
Nations, 1997), stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?
ID=1120 (accessed 4 August 2007).
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(1) the peaceful purposes of outer space; and (2)
the “common heritage of mankind” (CHM). The
terms “peaceful purposes” and “common heritage
of mankind” set forth social expectations that
space should be used for the common good.
The public persona that satisfies these sociocultural expectations can be found in the civil
space activities of space exploration and space
sciences. For current and emerging space
superpowers, its “space program” in the public
eye will be synonymous with its ability to explore
beyond the Earth and unlock the secrets of the
universe. Such a capability proves a state’s
technological prowess and single-minded ability
to achieve its lofty goals. Indeed, becoming a
space superpower is about vying for superpower
status on the larger stage. Two general principles
can be derived from the limited history of civil
space activities:
•
•

Prestige is the primary motivation for
developing a civil space program.
Spacefaring societies seek to extend their
cultural values into space.

Civil space activities can be categorized into four
main areas of current or future emphasis: (1)
space exploration; (2) space science; (3)
environmental security (both Earth and space
environments); and (4) human habitation. In
looking at these areas, the following can be
derived:
•
•

•
•

Space exploration attracts states and societies
that have expansionist traditions, expansionist
aspirations or both.
Space science is a strategic asset in that it
ensures technological independence cultural
identity, supports a science-based society, and
demonstrates capability and vision.
Space provides an opportunity to solve
common global problems through common
global solution.
Space settlements may one day be the key to
the survival of the species.

Civil space activities must balance supporting
national interests while advancing global interests.

Of all the sectors, civil space activities are most
likely to be cooperative in nature to achieve the
goals of such programs, yet the programs
themselves are subordinate to an actor’s broader
goals.
Economic Spacepower
Spacepower both influences and is influenced by
an actor’s economic power. Space applications
have enabled globalization, created opportunities
for development, and enhanced the global nature
of the economy. In its current state, spacepower
enables other economic enterprises. The potential
for creating wealth from space suggests the
likelihood of expanding development and
economic competition at some point in the future.
The point at which that potential is realized is
greatly dependent on the factors that shape
spacepower.
Spacepower has been a major, if often
underappreciated, factor in enabling the
globalization trend of the last twenty years. The
explosion in communication and information
technology was made possible through the global
view of Earth-orbiting satellites. For developing
areas of the world, space assets offer ways to
better manage natural resources and extend
services to remote populations. Additionally,
space applications have played a major role in
economic development.
•
•
•

•

Telecommunications from space can be used
to collect or distribute information from
dispersed territorial entities.
Space-based navigation facilitates the
management of global fleets enabling the
rapid movement of goods world-wide.
Earth observation and remote sensing play a
role in the design and implementation of new
land infrastructure, the management of crops
and natural resources, the enforcement of
agricultural policy and environmental treaties,
and the mitigation of natural disasters.
Meteorological satellites greatly improve
forecasting and monitoring of extreme
weather conditions and the ability to mitigate
their effects.
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The Commercial Space Industry
The commercial space industry includes both an
upstream segment, which includes manufacturers
of space hardware and providers of launch
services, and a downstream segment of satellite
operators and providers of space-enabled products
and services. Currently, the commercial space
industry is focused almost exclusively from Earthorbiting applications. The key characteristics of
space-based activities that bear on the commercial
space industry include: high risk; high-cost
research and development; complexity of new
technologies; economies of scope; dual-use nature
of the technology; long gestation and durability of
space assets; long value-added chain; and
economies of scale downstream.10
The current economic paradigm is to use satellite
technology to create wealth from space. Space
service include: satellite telecommunications;
satellite subscription and retail services;
interactive broadband; global positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT); and commercial
Earth observation.
The future economic paradigm will be to create
wealth in space. Additionally, economic
enterprises will not be limited to Earth’s orbital
plane. Eventually, wealth creation will occur on
other planets and celestial bodies as well as in
deep space. The timing of such activity is again
dependent on the set of interrelated shaping
factors. Some of the applications likely to create
wealth in space over the next fifty years include:
space tourism and adventure (orbital and suborbital flights); in-orbit servicing; space
manufacturing (e.g., pharmaceutical products and
new materials developed in microgravity); energy
from space. (e.g., space based solar power
systems to provide Energy to Earth.); and
extraterrestrial mining. (e.g., mines on the Moon
to harvest Helium-3 or mining near Earth objects
10

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), Space 2030: Exploring the
Future of Space Applications, (Paris: OECD,
2004).

for minerals). The ability to develop these markets
depends requires:
•
•
•

Significantly reduced access costs.
Favorable economic environment.
Safety and security of space assets and
humans in space.

A robust and vibrant space economy is highly
dependent on a number of factors. A review of
those factors yields the following insights:
•

•

•

•

•

The economic paradigm will eventually shift
from creating wealth from space to creating
wealth in space. New markets will develop
that could radically alter the outlook for
economic development in space.
Technology is the most significant factor
shaping the commercial space industry.
Radical
technological
improvements,
particularly in space access, will produce
profound changes in what can or cannot be
accomplished in space.
The high costs of current space activity
require heavy research and development
efforts and assumption of risks beyond the
scope of most space entrepreneurs. Sustained
involvement of governments will be required
to mitigate this risk in the near term.
From an economic perspective, space should
be a domain free to the pursuit of economic
goals. The economic “global commons”
approach is viewed differently from the
sociocultural context that suggests all
development benefits should be shared.
Stability of the space-enabled information
infrastructure is essential to continued global
economic growth and vitality. Conflict, or the
threat of conflict, would have serious effects
on information flows vital to the global
economy.
Security Spacepower

Notions of security in space (and through space)
vary markedly based on the perspectives of
diverse actors, a broad range of challenges and
threats, and the nature of various space activities
themselves. Space activities enable economic
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security by enhancing the value of global
economic interdependency, while reducing the
vulnerabilities of singular actors. Human security
can be advanced through such activities as: spacebased telemedicine; infectious disease control;
and enabling expansion of economic development
in rural areas or those areas previously
inaccessible to basic services. Environmental
security can be enhanced through global
monitoring of the Earth and solar system. Energy
security may be achieved by those that are able to
tap into a potentially unlimited source of solar and
other forms of power in space.
While space has a role in each of these security
areas, spacepower is often thought of in the
context of national security as it enhances the
ability of spacefaring nations to compete and
thrive in an anarchic international security
environment. The use of the terms “power” and
“spacepower” are most closely associated with the
notion of power as accorded to the state. While
there clearly are many other forms of power
wielded by many different types of actors in and
through space, this project assumes that the state
will remain the dominant form of power broker
for the foreseeable future. Thus, it is important to
consider the how spacepower relates to national
security.
States and other actors tend to focus on pursuing
their own interests. Space capabilities enhance the
ability of an actor to gain economic, political, or
military power relative to those that do not
possess spacepower. Space confers strategic,
operational, and tactical advantages because it
provides a global view of the terrestrial
environment in which competition and conflict
currently takes place. In the future, space actors
may seek to control key “geographic” regions of
space (e.g., libration points, lunar antipodal
points, preferred earth/lunar orbits) to gain
strategic advantage for exploiting resources or
establishing space lines of communication.
Depending upon how it perceives its national
interests, a space power may pursue security in
several basic ways: it may seek to maintain a
favorable status quo; it may seek to expand its

power to increase or close a perceived gap relative
to other space powers; or it may seek to limit or
constrain the power of other space actors. A
spacefaring state will have two main concerns
with regard to security and its space capabilities:
(1) how to use space capabilities to provide for,
support, and enhance the overall security of the
state or related actors (security through space);
and (2) maintaining the security of space
capabilities themselves, both military and nonmilitary (security in space).
Space is an operationally distinct medium.
Spacepower, however, is not strategically distinct;
it is part and parcel of an actor’s ability to
influence human (and perhaps natural) events
regardless of where they occur. Spacepower may
provide strategic advantage on earth or in space.
Security through space implies the use of space
assets to enhance the security posture of an actor
or set of actors on Earth. Space capabilities may
be used by an actor to prevent conflict and ensure
stability through:
•

•

Transparency. The ability to “see”
capabilities as they are developed and events
as they unfold reduces uncertainty and
provides strategic warning.
Deterrence. The space-based reconnaissance
complex plays an important role in providing
warning as well as command and control for
nuclear forces.

Conversely, a state may use its space assets to
enhance terrestrial warfighting capability through:
•

•

Force enhancement. Space forces greatly
enhance the capability of air, land, and sea
forces through PNT, command and control,
and
intelligence,
surveillance,
and
reconnaissance (ISR).
Force application. In the future, actors may
develop ways to apply force directly from
space to generate combat effects on the
terrestrial battlefield. Defenses may also be
deployed in space to deter and protect against
ballistic missile attacks.
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Security in space concerns the protection of space
assets themselves, whether used for military or
civilian purposes. States, particularly those with
strategic advantage, will seek to maximize their
freedom of action in space. In order to do so, an
actor may seek capabilities in the following areas:

•

Transparency. Space situational awareness
(SSA) is essential to identifying potential threats
in space. Equally important is transparency over
potential adversaries ground based activity as it
relates to space.

•

Protection. The fragile and vulnerable nature of
space assets, particularly commercial and civil
assets, suggests that protection measures be
considered early in the design cycle of space
systems. Military forces may be called upon to
protect civilian assets.
•

•

Denial. The ability to negate adversary space
capabilities, through such means as ASAT
programs, may permanently or temporarily
shift advantage in space.
Space control. Space control is a combination
of protection and denial strategies. An actor
desiring freedom of action in space may also
wish to limit its adversary’s freedom of action
to remove a perceived threat. This requires
maximizing both protection and negation
capabilities (e.g., defensive and offensive
counterspace).

A number of security challenges and dilemmas
arise as actors pursue individual interests in space:
•

•

Space assets are fragile and vulnerable.
Should
space
become
a
contested
environment? The fragility and vulnerability
of space systems make them attractive targets
and complicates the ability to defend in space.
The lines between civilian and military
space assets become blurred. Systems
deployed in space have the ability to be used
for more than one purpose. Commercial
communications satellites carry a large portion
of military communications and can become
vulnerable to attack in a conflict scenario.

Capabilities designed to enhance security
through space may reduce security in
space, and vice versa. For example, spacebased missile defenses may enhance
protection against ballistic missiles, but they
themselves become a strategic target and open
the possibility for conflict in space.
Achieving the economic and sociocultural
potential of space requires enduring
stability in the domain. Individual or
unilateral strategies to expand power, limit
adversaries’ power, or maintain freedom of
action in space may threaten overall stability
of the system.

Spacefaring states will pursue security strategies
in space based on their degree of reliance on space
capabilities, perceived vulnerabilities both in and
from space, and the perceived behavior of other
actors. The following behavioral models may be
observed as actors seek to meet their security
needs in space:
•

Space dominator. A domination strategy can
only be attempted by a comprehensive
spacepower with a highly advance military
capability. A space dominator is likely to be
highly reliant on spacepower to achieve its
objectives in both in space and on Earth, and
at the same time may feel a certain amount of
insecurity due to the vulnerability and fragility
of its space assets. Such a strategy would seek
to increase its relative power vis-à-vis other
space actors to enable freedom of action to
pursue its interests in and through space. The
dominator sees space as the ultimate high
ground, and perceives a strategic advantage to
dominating certain key regions of space, either
for military or economic advantage. Such an
actor would also seek to deny any competitor
access to these areas or other areas that would
diminish the dominator’s relative advantage.
The risks associated with such a strategy
include high cost of pursuing technologies,
miscalculation, potential for arms race, and
asymmetric responses by other actors. Space
dominators would feel challenged by another
space dominator, constrainers, or spoilers.
54

Space and Defense, Winter 2008

•

•

•

•

Space protector. Space protection is an
alternate strategy that might be employed by a
highly reliant, highly vulnerable space power.
The aim of the protector differs in that it seeks
only to protect its ability to benefit from space
without regard to other actors. In other words,
the protector seeks to maximize the absolute
benefit it derives from space without concern
of relative gain over others. A protection
strategy would maximize capabilities such as:
SSA; passive or active satellite protection; and
operationally responsive space. At the same
time, this strategy risks providing a window of
opportunity to a competitor to advance its
position relative to the protector. A protector
would feel threatened by a space dominator or
a spoiler, or an actor moving to one of those
strategies.
Constrainer. An actor with more limited
space capabilities might adopt a constraining
strategy to limit relative gains by other actors.
A constrainer would likely be less reliant on
space than a more comprehensive space
power, but may feel threatened by increasing
gains by others. Arms control and legal
restrictions are favored in this type of strategy
as they are used to constrain the power of
other actors. The object of this constraining
behavior is likely to be a perceived space
dominator or a possible spoiler that develops
asymmetric capabilities. While attempting to
constrain certain actors, this strategy might
inadvertently allow other actors to gain
primacy.
Spoiler. Like a constrainer, a spoiler may be
at a relative disadvantage with regard to other
space actors, but this disadvantage is likely to
be more strategically significant, particularly
in times of crisis or war against a
comprehensive space power. A spoiler would
seek to employ asymmetric power, such as an
ASAT capability to mitigate this vulnerability.
Spoilers are most likely to arise in reaction to
a space dominator or protector. The spoiler
risks miscalculating the response of its object
and may find itself as the target of retaliation.
Collaborator. A collaborative strategy may
be employed by an actor who does not feel a
direct threat from the space capabilities of

•

other actors, and wants to avoid direct security
competition in the future. It will seek to
protect its absolute gains in space through
collective
security
arrangements
and
collaboration in other areas. The collaborator
seeks interdependence with other space actors
to avoid conflict. It may align with a
dominator, protector, or constrainer and may
feel threatened by a different dominator or
spoiler.
Free rider. Free riders seek to minimize their
security profile and depend on the protection
of the system or of others. They tend not to be
in direct competition with other security actors
and seek to maximize the absolute benefits
they derive from their space activities.

Ideally, stability is best achieved when all actors
pursue strategies that seek only absolute gains
from their space activity, rather than relative gains
in power vis-à-vis other space actors. Protectors,
collaborators, and free riders are compatible with
mutual gains by other actors. Dominators,
constrainers, and spoilers look to enhance their
own spacepower or constrain or deny the power
of others and therefore, cause more perturbations
in the system. The more asymmetry that is
introduced among actors, the more unstable the
situation. For instance, two dominators in the
system may create security problems for each
other, but may create a stable system as each one
checks the other. Nonetheless, a dominator
challenged by a spoiler can lead to conflict as a
spoiler sees a narrow window of opportunity for
courses of action. Moreover, as perceived security
needs change, so will the strategies employed. As
one actor perceives a change by another actor, it is
likely to adapt if that change creates more
vulnerability or offers new opportunities to gain
relative advantage.
Summary
The development of spacepower theory is an
ongoing process. As the world develops new
technologies, employs new ways of using space,
and develops new frameworks for regulating it,
the impact of space will continue to evolve.
Spacepower theory provides the opportunity to
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influence this process in a way that maximizes the
benefits of space for the global society. The future

of humankind will be written by the thought and
action of society as it ventures into the universe.
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Summer Space Seminar 2007
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Space Policy Institute, George Washington University
Colorado and Washington, DC, May – June 2007

The Summer Space Seminar 2007 proffered two
principal goals: (1) to foster an education and
interest in the interdisciplinary areas of space with
the intent to develop space professionals now or
in the future; and (2) to develop a network of
relations across future civil, commercial, and
military space professionals that will likely
emerge from the participants in the Seminar.
In regard to the first goal, the Seminar exposed
participants to the breadth and depth of space
activities in the civil, military, and commercial
areas. The seminar covered a number of topics:
(1) space technology, space physics, space
weather, planetary sciences, space law, space
policy, space management, space history, space
economics, and human space exploration in the
civil area; (2) national security space, including
the role of space in bringing effects to the
warfighter, Air Force space professional
development, Air Force space history, and space
power in the military area; and (3) space
commercial development in the satellite and space
launch industries. The relationships among these
topics were explored across a number of
perspectives. To illustrate, participants were first
exposed to the technology and science of space
activities, followed by discussions on the political,
legal, economic, and social aspects that influence
the development and application of the various
civil, commercial, military space activities.

For some in the group the seminar was their first
exposure to the role and importance of space, for
others it exposed them to other areas that affect
space beyond technology and science like policy,
law, and economics, and for others it served as
useful forum for further professional development
given that several of the participants worked, or
are currently employed, as space professionals.
Given this diversity among participants, a great
deal of learning and socialization took place
among the group that will serve to meet the
second goal in future years.
Northrop Grumman has agreed to support a 2nd
Summer Space Seminar planned for May 2008.
Ambassador Roger Harrison and Dr. Eligar Sadeh
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

The Seminar was successful in recruiting a
diverse set of participants. The program brought
together students from the United States (U.S.)
Air Force Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S.
Military
Academy,
George
Washington
University, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology helping to lay a foundation for a
future space policy community in the military,
civilian government, and private sectors.
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China Working Group: China, Space, and Strategy
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University
Keystone, Colorado, June 2007

Chinese advances in its space program in recent years
has led to a growing international interest in the
implications of Chinese programs in the civil,
military, and commercial space sectors. This
workshop, sponsored by the United States (U.S.) Air
Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies and the Air University School of
Advanced Air and Space Studies, brought together a
community of experts and policy-makers to discuss
the implications of current and future Chinese space
developments on space policy and law, in particular
the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test conducted in
January 2007.
Thirty-five individuals attended the workshop,
including, among others, Major General Armor of the
National Security Space Office, Dick Buenneke of the
State Department (State), Tom Reich representing the
East Asia Bureau of State, Hong Yuan of the Center
for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Studies in
Beijing, Wu Chunsi of the Shanghai Institute for
International Studies, Dean Cheng of the Office of
Naval Analysis, who acted as a translator when need
for the Chinese nationals, and representatives from
Europe, aerospace companies like Lockheed Martin,
and leading academic scholars and consultants in
space policy and space law. The one-day workshop
focused on both military and commercial aspects of
the U.S.-Chinese relationship in space. It was
conducted under Chatham House rules, which forbid
citing specific comments made by the participants.
In general, it was my impression from the statements
made during the day, as I said in my summation at the
end of the session, that the U.S. side was leaning well
forward, ready to engage more actively at any sign
that the Chinese were willing to be forthcoming.
There was little to sign of a positive response from
the Chinese side, although there was a statement to
the effect that, in the “opinion” of the speaker, there
will be no further ASAT tests of any kind, at least

through 2012. It is safe to say that U.S. officials at the
meeting were skeptical about this assurance.
Of note, was the revelation that the Chinese scholars
viewed U.S. actions the past decade with much
suspicion and even threatening to China’s national
interests. In this regard, the Chinese nationals directly
pointed to the U.S. unwillingness to cooperate with
the Chinese in civil and commercial space, U.S.
actions like the “inadvertent” bombing of the Chinese
embassy during the war in Kosovo, and the emerging
doctrine of counterspace operations in the U.S. that is
also reflected in the 2006 Bush national space policy.
It was mentioned by the Chinese scholars that these
events encouraged the Chinese to undertake a path to
developing comprehensive space power capabilities.
The ASAT test of January 2007 conducted by the
Chinese was viewed internally as routine test along
this path
The Chinese scholars also emphasized the importance
of language. For example, the talk of “transparency,”
which is an important idea that U.S. officials stress to
the Chinese, as the word is translated into Mandarin,
has overtones of espionage, and therefore, would not
elicit a positive response. This pointed to the need for
more involvement by Chinese linguists in formulating
our policy statements on China space; one term
suggested at the workshop was “clarity of intent.”
On the question of Chinese decision-making, the
Chinese nationals emphasized that the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) reported up separate communication
channels to the Supreme Council and that there was
no direct communication between the two entities.
Further, the thinking among the Chinese scholars was
that the PLA is quite insular and there was not enough
attention paid to the international implications of the
Chinese ASAT test. The implication is that the test is
not something that the MFA would likely not have
suggested.
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There seemed as well to be a consensus that the U.S.
reaction to the ASAT test had been relatively
moderate, that the US was ready for more dialogue,
and that by “transparency” in our policy statements
what seemed to be meant was a desire for more
clarity of intent in space on the part of the Chinese. In
my conversations with Mr. Yuan, I suggested that as a
gesture of goodwill the Chinese might want to host a
similar Space Working Group meeting next year. He
responded that it would be a useless exercise, since
the Chinese participants would not dare to speak
frankly at such a meeting. Finally, the America
military participants emphasized that they had a
policy directive in the Bush Space Policy to push for
greater engagement, including with the Chinese, on
space issues, and that this is what they intended to do.
The Chinese scholars conveyed that it is in fact the
Chinese willingness to demonstrate space power that
creates opportunities for dialogue with the U.S. The
key is that the U.S. does not, and thus needs to, view
China as a “legitimate” power. Moreover, the Chinese
nationals stated that China desires to be a responsible
player in world affairs.
This workshop was second annual China Working
Group meeting and the first to include Chinese
nationals and the U.S. State Department. The meeting
represents a possible channel for discussions, what is
being called by State Track 1.5 as distinct from Track
2. It also strengthened the Eisenhower Center’s
working relationship with State, our contacts in China
and with the Chinese community, and our
relationships among scholars and think-tanks.
Ambassador Roger Harrison and Dr. Eligar Sadeh
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
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Future of Space Commerce Workshop:
Reducing Risks and Fostering Partnerships –
Synergies between Civil, Military, Commercial, and New Space
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
Futron Corporation
NASA Ames Research Center
Breckenridge, Colorado, August 2007

The Future of Space Commerce Workshop brought
together participants from the civil, military,
commercial, and new space sectors, and relevant
academic, consulting, business, and financial
organizations to discuss and explore how risks
associated with space commerce development can be
reduced, and to examine synergies to strengthen and
advance partnerships between the sectors. The
workshop was hosted by the United States (U.S.) Air
Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies in cooperation with Futron
Corporation and NASA Ames Research Center.
A number of topics were addressed at the workshop.
These topics included: availability of private money
and finance; government and private sector
technology drivers; political and legal framework;
and environment. The session on private money and
finance addressed a number of issues that ranged
from: business planning, capital markets, government
contracting, venture capital, “angel” investors,
realistic return on investment, markets for products
and services, cost or affordability, government
procurement or purchasing of commercial services,
prizes for technology innovation, subsidies, tax
benefits and credits, loans, and government corporate
ownership models.
The technology drivers part of the workshop focused
on technology transfer, heritage systems, low cost
technical innovation, in-house expertise, contractingout issues, technical personnel and workforce, and
reliability and responsiveness of technical systems.
Following this session, the one on politics and law
looked at safety regulations, licensing processes,
export controls, transfer of intellectual property
rights, and patent protection. Finally, the session on
the environment examined issues related to space

commerce and space situational awareness, space
traffic management, and orbital debris.
Summary of the Discussions
•

•

•

•

There is growing dependence between the
different space sectors- civil, military, and
commercial. Space in many ways is at a crossroad in all these sectors. The key issue is how to
move forward into a “new” space age driven by
space commercial activity (see Addendum 1).
There is a strong case to be made that space is in
the national security interests, but a much weaker
case is to be made that space is in our national
economic interests. In the U.S. national security
trumps commercial space leading to policies, like
export controls, that undermine space commercial
development. In addition, there is little
understanding of the pervasiveness of space in
many commercial activities and transactions.
Of concern to fostering such a new space age, is
to shift the paradigm on how humans view space.
This shift needs to better consider humanspace/space-terrestrial connections that will drive
space commercial activity.
A key question to address is why invest in
commercial space? Clearly, there are markets, but
the ideas need to be accessible and realistic as to
ROI considerations. The key issue with
commercial space is not technical risk per say
(though single point failure problems can be an
issue for space launch in particular), but the issue
of financing and ROI.
The issue of risk cuts across a number of factors
from technical ones related to development and
innovation, political and legal ones largely
concerning the regulatory environment, and
business and market risks. Space commerce is
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•

•

•

•

•

characterized by a misallocation of risk versus
reward (as in ROI). There is also less tolerance for
risk as it is in many ways being “regulated” out of
the way of doing business.
There needs to be some attention toward
developing possible “disruptive” technologies that
could dramatically change the space commerce
paradigm. “Experimentation” in space in such
areas as smallsats and partnerships with both
private space companies and non-space
companies is important in this regard. NASA is
interested in fostering private space commerce.
Examples include: the NASA COTS program,
Space Act Agreements with New Space
companies, and non-space partnerships with
Goggle, Microsoft, Sun, and Biotech firms.
Much of the success in commercial space exists in
the Satcom sector where the many of the key
players are not seen or perceived as “space”
companies. The fact is that many industries are
enabled by space assets. Value-added services
making use of remote sensing and GPS data are
important examples. There are rapidly growing
markets that will continue to consume such
services.
There are a number of constraints on the
emergence of this new space age. This includes:
issues of innovation as many programs and
projects are locked into funding and acquisition
patterns that cannot be easily changed or
modified; the lack of political and public support
for many space initiatives due to programs and
projects that are over-budget and over reasonable
development times; and the U.S. export control
regime, namely ITAR, that posits barriers to
international trade and partnerships that
characterize much of space commercial activity.
The basis for positive change to these constraints
entails political leadership and vision, better
management
systems
and
organizational
approaches to overcome budgetary and
development time issues, and addressing
workforce issues.
There is a general misconception that space law,
in particular international space law, is prohibitive
to space commerce. This, in fact, is not the case.
International space law simply places the state as
the responsible party for any commercial

•

•

•

•

•

•

activities that may take place under its legal
jurisdiction.
Space commerce is undergoing radical change
due to private space activities that will lead to
operational space ports to support private human
spaceflight. The U.S. federal government, through
the FAA-AST, is working to foster a positive
regulatory environment that allows for private
space activities to grow and prosper.
Education and workforce issues where viewed as
critical ones for space commerce development.
Where will space commerce get the next
generation technical workforce? High-percentages
(more than 50% in some cases) of STEM graduate
student in the U.S. are foreign nationals. Given
this fact, there is a need to address export control
concerns (e.g., ITAR) to better learn from foreign
nationals (e.g., facilitate technology transfer).
Other approaches could involve making better use
of off-the-shelf technologies. Clearly, there is a
need to emphasize a national commitment to
STEM education at all levels.
There is a strong consensus that the U.S., export
control regime, ITAR, needs to be modified.
ITAR has a direct effect on space commerce (see
articles in this issue of the journal) and U.S. space
and defense industrial base. ITAR also affects
government agencies as much as those on the
commercial side of space.
The U.S. is at disadvantage in the global space
business due to ITAR and the clear demarcations
that are drawn in the U.S. between government
space and commercial space. This latter issue
limits the range of approaches that the U.S. could
take to better foster space commercial
development.
The space environment is another key issue that
affects space commerce. There is a mission cost,
for example, to mitigate environmental dangers,
like orbital debris proliferation. There are as well
issues related to scarcity of resources and their
efficient use, such as spectrum allocations.
International standards are a key towards
addressing many of the space environmental
issues and challenges, and also necessary for
space business to exercise due diligence in their
safety and liability concerns and obligations.
Space traffic management is another issue that
requires some resolution as there is currently no
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•

U.S. government policy on this or any set of
international standards (“rules of the road”) on
this issue. This is of concern as apace is more
crowed with more government and commercial
players.
Related to the space environmental issues is how
to bets hare data (space situational awareness)
between governments and with space commercial
What Works

entities (see summary report herein on Space
Situational Awareness workshop).
A summary of the synthesis discussions that took
place at the workshop is provided in the table below.
The synthesis discussion focused on what works in
space commerce, what does not work, and what are
the ways forward to better develop and foster space
commerce.

Does Not Work

Economy depends on space assets /
critical economic enabler
Commercial satellite operations
New space players / new operational
modes and ways of doing business
Stable funding for space commence

Workforce issues

Emergence of prizes to encourage
innovation (see Addendum 1)
More willingness for risk-taking (New
Space)
Concentrated private ownership /
availability pf private monies

Space is branded with NASA and
not with commercial activity
Barriers to entry / economies of
scale, politics as in ITAR
Low tolerance for risk (heritage
space companies)

Space business ideas are more realistic
(ROI issues) / better business planning
and execution

Over regulation of space
commerce (issue with Federal
Acquisition Regulations)

Export controls (ITAR)
Space manufacturing not a
realistic business
Cost-plus contracting

Ways Forward
Develop space-based
infrastructure (government lead)
Reform ITAR
Reduce cost of doing space
business
Aim to get cost-plus contracting to
no more than 15% of the way to
do business / move more to fixedpricing contracting model
Non-traditional partnerships
Leadership and vision on space
commercial development
Delivering what is promised
(budget and development time
issues)
Evolve legal regimes to meet
challenges of space commerce

Addendum 1: Envisioning Space Commerce 2010 – 2030
Molly Macauley, Senior Fellow Resources for the Future
Perspectives
(1) “But for now, in spite of my usual optimism, I
must say that I do not see any ready examples of
stand-alone business successes in space. All must
count on government orders to supplement their
commercial business.” John L. McLucas, Space
Commerce (Boston, Harvard University Press), 1991,
p. 213.
(2) “If we ever see cities on the moon or Mars – the
kind of thing science fiction once promised so
enticingly – I’m betting that the lion’s share of credit
will go not to NASA but to 21st century rocketeers.”
Glenn Reynolds, reviewing Rocketeers by Michael

Belfiore in The Wall Street Journal 28-29 July 2007,
p.11.
(3) “Given NASA’s politicization, we should hope
that the space industry evolves as aviation did –
transitioning from ponderous government-run
projects to mostly private-sector activities attuned to
customer needs. That raises the question: Could
entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos
eventually put NASA out of business? Perhaps, but
not for the next couple of decades – space has
colossal economic barriers to entry. Given that NASA
is sure to be around for a while, taxpayers should
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insist the space agency be reconfigured to produce
tangible benefits for all of us {earth observations and
asteroid monitoring}. With any luck, private space
enterprise will eventually find success and begin to
exert competitive market pressures on the government
space program.” Gregg Easterbrook, “How NASA
Screwed Up,” WIRED, June 2007, pp. 154-155. {}
added.
Space Commerce
Early Years (1960s–1980s)
•

•
•
•

•

COMSAT raised its first capital by way of an
oversubscribed $200 million stock issue, but
failed to raise money for a direct to home satellite
television service several years’ later.
RCA, Western Union, GE, AT&T, GTE, Hughes–
all had relatively easy access to capital.
Smaller companies (American Satellite, Direct
Broadcast Satellite Corporation, Orion Satellite
Corporation) had much more difficult access.
Among early navigation suppliers, Qualcomm
leased Ku-band transponders and used equity and
funding from Goldman Sachs. Geostar required
dedicated satellites and had more difficulty
(Gerard O’Neill and Wheat First Securities
provided initial funding).
Orbital Sciences had private financing and
venture capital; sold part of the company to
Hercules (which provided the rocket motors); then
went public in 1990.
Middle Years (1980s–2007)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Deregulation
here
and
internationally
(telecommunications satellites).
Mergers and acquisitions in aerospace (from 76
companies in 1980 to 5 in 2007).
Venture capital.
Return of prizes.
Return of the industrialist.
Emergence of space access as commodity.

Coming Decades (2007–2030)
•
•
•
•
•

Relatively few mergers (1998 – attempted merger
between Northrop Grumman and Lockheed
Martin failed to obtain government approval).
Acquisitions? (Increase in ownership share from
40% to 100% of Scaled Composites (builder of
SpaceShipOne) by Northrop Grumman.
Will capital markets, government policy,
industrialist interest be favorable to space
commerce?
Will responsibility for and funding of Earth
observations for environmental monitoring
evolves to another agency?
What will happen to federal funding of space
activities with the arrival of financial challenges
of entitlements programs (Social Security and
Medicare)?
Government (Taxpayer) Financing and Space
Commerce
Tax-Based Incentives

•
•
•

Tax credits (most notably, the R&D tax credit).
R&D expensing.
Some previous legislative initiatives:
Space Tourism Promotion Act 2001 - H.R. 2443
- sought to stimulate the development of space
tourism by means of guaranteed loans, tax credits,
establishment of a "straightforward and
predictable regulatory structure.” However, US
government space vehicles and the US modules of
the space station could not be used by anyone
except officially permitted visitors. Sponsored by
Rep. Nick Lampson (D-TX).
Zero Gravity Zero Tax Bill 2003- H.R. 914 –
would exclude space-related income from gross
income for calculating income taxes for 10 years,
except
for
income
from
space-based
telecommunications, remote-sensing, and space
launch companies currently in business. Would
provide $100 million in tax credits for
investments in new space enterprises. No capital
gains tax on the sale of the stock for a period of
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10 years. Sponsored by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
(R-CA).

Industrialists, Other Champions, and Private
Capital

Invest in Space Now Act 2003 - H.R. 2177 –
would provide tax credits to investments in
qualified new space launch vehicles. The sliding
scale would drop from 50% of the value of the
stock in 2002 to zero after 2010. Sponsored by
Rep. Ken Calvert (R-CA) and Rep. Solomon Ortiz
(TX).

Industrialists

Spaceport Equality Act 2003 - H.R.644 – would
allow commercial spaceports, like airports, to be
financed with bonds exempt from federal tax on
their interest payments (much like tax-free
municipal bonds). Sponsored by Rep. Dave
Weldon (R-FL.).
Competitive Bidding Processes
•
•

Grants and contracts (prize is a commitment to
procure).
Prizes (typically ex ante, or “inducement prizes”
as distinguished from ex post awards).

Esther Dyson, an investor in Constellation Services,
ICON Aircraft, Space Adventures, XCOR, and ZeroGravity Corporation, writing in Space News, 14 May
2007: “an illustrious crew of pioneers:”
•
•
•
•
•

Elon Musk, founder and CEO of Space
Exploration Technologies Corp and founder of
PayPal.
Vern Raburn, CEO of Eclipse Aviation (which
produces very light jets) and formerly at
Microsoft, Symantec, and Lotus.
Jeff Bezos, founder of Blue Origin and still at
Amazon, which he also founded.
Jeff Greason, founder of XCOR and formerly
with Intel.
Ed Iacobucci, president and CEO of air taxi
operator Dayjet Corporation and founder of
Citrix.

She goes on to comment in Space News:
Use of government-owned, government-operated or
contractor-operated laboratories or other research
facilities
State or local government concessions (such as
financing spaceports)
Other forms of government involvement indirectly
(but perhaps significantly) affecting financing
•
•
•
•

Oversight of mergers and acquisitions.
Intellectual property protection.
Legislative and regulatory provisions.
National security concerns (such as those
addressed by International Traffic in Arms
Regulations- ITAR).

“While investors are starting to take note, they remain
nervous. The challenge for these start-ups right now is
that investors want to invest in the third round. They
want someone else to take the risks so they can come
in when the price has been beaten down and the risks
have been overcome. …This is indeed what happened
with FedEx. As venture capitalist Rick Stowe recalls:
‘The third-round FedEx investors were most – but not
all – of the first- and second-round investors. The
only new ones were (lawyer) Bill Hewitt and
management other than (founder) Fred (Smith). The
third round ($3.9 million for two-thirds of the
company) was one of history’s best deals, but we
couldn’t sell it to anyone who wasn’t already mired in
the company. The upside was a little murky at the
time!”
Examples not on Dyson’s list:
Paul Allen, cofounder of Microsoft and investor in
Scaled Composites (builder of SpaceShipOne and
winner of the $10 million Ansari X Prize in 2004.
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•

•
•

Sir Richard Branson, founder and owner of over
350 companies including Virgin Records and
Virgin Atlantic Airways and founder of Virgin
Galactic, which plans to license the technology
behind SpaceShipOne.
Robert Bigelow, real estate developer and
developer of the Genesis inflatable space station
structures.
Space News, 25 June 2007

“In 2006 approximately 234,000 angel investors in
the US invested $25.6 billion in 51,000 deals across
all industries. Total seed-stage angel funding for new
space ventures, however, amounted to at most $10
million spread over approximately 10 deals, which
were sourced entirely from individual investors…
The disparity in these figures clearly demonstrates
both the absence of an educated and space-savvy
angel investor community, as well as a pressing need
for companies to show potential investors better
business models and more experienced management
teams.”
“U.S. venture capital investment in 2006, in contrast,
reached $25.8 billion, and was spread over slightly
more than 3,000 deals with no known investments in
core space infrastructure startups.”
“Traditional definitions of ‘New Space’ and
‘alt.space’ tend to emphasize high-risk Earth-to-space
and space-to-space applications, such as space
tourism, rocket launchers, on-orbit refueling facilities,
on-orbit servicing and space solar power. These
definitions ignore the wider expanse of lower-risk
space-to-Earth and Earth-to-Earth startups such as
telecommunications, Earth observation, navigation
and mapping, telemedicine, space-themed attractions,
and many other mainstream applications. …superior
investment prospects due to track record of successful
exits that are well understood by the mainstream
investor community around the globe.”
Note on the Jargon
The “technology startup financing pipeline” includes:
(1) “pre-seed” and “seed-stage,” early stage where
angel investors play a role; and (2) “venture” stage, a

somewhat later stage– with slightly more certain exit
strategies.
Background Information
Examples of inducement prizes sponsored by private
sector:
• Auto races (achievements in speed, durability,
aesthetics, and economy) – Publishers,
industrialists.
• Aviation (distance, speed, endurance) –
Publishers, industrialists.
• Ansari X-Prize (26 teams, 7 different countries,
estimated $100 million of private R&D spending
for $10 million prize).
• Archon X Prize for Genomics ($10 M to map 100
human genomes in 10 days to advance
personalized preventative medicine) – X-Prize
Foundation.
• Virgin Earth Challenge ($ 25 M to remove 1
billion metric tons of carbon for 10 years; $5 M at
start of removal and $20 M at end of 10 years;
financed by Richard Branson).
• The Grainger Challenge Prize (($1.0 M,
$200,000, and $100,000 for design and creation of
a point-of-use water treatment system for
developing countries) – The National Academy of
Engineering and the Grainger Foundation.
Examples of inducement prizes sponsored by
government sector or government and private sectors:
• Chronometers (longitude)– Royal Navy, London
merchants, and commercial ships’ captains (three
prizes for varying degrees of accuracy; first place
about equal to US $3.1 million in today’s dollars).
• Alkali– French Academy of Sciences.
• Canning–
Napoleon’s
Society
for
the
Encouragement of Industry.
• Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program – sponsored
by US Environmental Protection Agency and 25
electric utilities (winner (Whirlpool) never
received full allotment of prize money).
• The Automotive X Prize (AXP) (build a 100 mile
per gallon vehicle – funding not yet attained as of
August 2007)– X Prize Foundation, other
foundations, nongovernmental organizations,
government agencies.
• DARPA Grand Challenge.
• DDR&E Prize (various amounts to solve
problems of military interest; current offering is
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$1 M, $.5 M, and $.25 M for a wearable poser
system)– The 2007 NDAA Defense bill.
Challenge Date
Oct 13-21, 2007
Oct 13-21, 2007
Oct 26-28, 2007

Challenge Name
2007 Beam Power Challenge
2007 Tether Challenge
Lunar Lander Challenge

2008 (Date TBD)

Astronaut Glove Challenge

2008 (Date TBD)
2008 (Date TBD)
Expires Jun 1, 2008

2008 Regolith Excavation
Challenge
2008 Personal Air Vehicle
Challenge
Moon Regolith Oxygen
Extraction (Moon ROx)
Challenge

•

NASA Centennial Challenges

Purse
Allied Organization
$500K The Spaceward Foundation (non-NASA link)
$500K The Spaceward Foundation (non-NASA link)
$2M
The X PRIZE Foundation (non-NASA link)
Volanz Aerospace Inc./Spaceflight America (non$400K
NASA link)
California Space Education & Workforce Institute
$750K
(CSEWI) (non-NASA link)
Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency (CAFE)
$300K
Foundation (non-NASA link)
$1M

California Space Education & Workforce Institute
(CSEWI) (non-NASA link)

Abbreviations:
CAFE = Comparative Aircraft Flight Efficiency Foundation
CSEWI = California Space Education and Workforce Institute
Moon ROx = Moon Regolith Oxygen
Source: centennialchallenges.nasa.gov (accessed July 2007)

Challenge Date

Aug 4-11, 2007

Challenge Name

Winner/Purse
Vance Turner / $100K Vantage Prize
Dave and Diane Anders / $50K Noise Prize
John Rehn / $25K Handling Qualities
Vance Turner / $25K Shortest Runway Prize
2007 Personal Air
Vance Turner / $25K Efficiency Prize
Vehicle Challenge
Dave and Diane Anders / $15K Top Speed
First Prize
Vance Turner / $10K Top Speed Second
Prize

May 11-12, 2007

2007 Regolith
Excavation
Challenge

None/$250K

May 2-3, 2007

2007 Astronaut
Glove Challenge

Peter Homer/$200K

2006 Beam Power
None/$200K
Challenge
2006 Tether
Oct 20-21, 2006
None/$200K
Challenge
2006 Lunar
Oct 20-21, 2006
None/$2M
Lander Challenge
2005 Beam Power
Oct 21-23, 2005
None/$50K
Challenge
2005 Tether
Oct 21-23, 2005
None/$50K
Challenge
Source: centennialchallenges.nasa.gov (accessed July 2007)
Oct 20-21, 2006

Allied Organization

Comparative Aircraft
Flight Efficiency (CAFE)
Foundation
(non-NASA link)

California Space
Education & Workforce
Institute (CSEWI)
(non-NASA link)
Volanz Aerospace
Inc./Spaceflight America
(non-NASA link)
The Spaceward
Foundation
The Spaceward
Foundation
The X PRIZE
Foundation
The Spaceward
Foundation
The Spaceward
Foundation
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Comparing Government-funded Prizes, Contracts, and Grant
Risk borne by innovator not taxpayer

Possibly more appropriate for basic research
(risk shared with researcher who must “publish
or perish”; knowledge gained from research may
be quickly and widely shared)

Subsidizes final output or product not inputs
Pros
Lower administrative costs

Possibly more appropriate for very high-cost
projects

Leverage non-financial incentives (prestige,
media spotlight)

Pre-proposal and other interim
competition/review (“prize-like” elements) can
reduce principal-agent information asymmetry

Lower barriers to entry for small innovative
companies
Information gleaned about technology state-ofthe-art in event of non-winner
Difficult to “size” the prize – depends on ‘value’
to nation
Cons

May reduce duplicative research
Government susceptible to cost estimation and
cost-overrun problems related to principalagent situation

Up-front liquidity constraint
High entry barriers
Less suited if innovators cannot bear all the risk
(or very high-cost projects)
May lead to excessive duplication of effort
during competition

•

•

•

•

•

Susceptible to Congressional earmarking

May reward “first past the post” prioritizing
speed rather than quality
Issues with government sponsorship: Likely to require Congressional appropriation; multi-year funding;
need to convince competitors that government will not renege; if no one wins, is agency budget reduced or
can funding be reprogrammed; desirable to have information on benefits to taxpayer of the technological
advance in order to “size” the prize.
Some researchers suggest that the contestants themselves propose the size of the prize, as they are better
informed about costs and the likelihood of success- Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale, “Optimal Design of
Research Contests,” American Economic Review 93(3): 646-671 (2003).
Sources: Based on Richard G. Newell and Nathan E. Wilson, “Technology Prizes for Climate Change
Mitigation,” Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 05-33 June 2005 (table 1); Molly K. Macauley,
“Advantages and Disadvantages of Prizes in a Portfolio of Financial Incentives for Space Activities,” Space
Policy 21(1): 29-39 (2005)

Towards a Space Commerce Future with Prizes?
•

Less appropriate for applied technology research

Could move beyond NASA to include NSF,
NIST, DOE, etc, if broader than space influence
but would then face complexity of oversight from
multiple Congressional committees
The 2004 Aldridge Commission’s report (“A
Journey to Inspire, Innovate, and Discover”)
outlines one of the possible ways the U.S. could
establish a prize for lunar settlement:
“...the Commission suggests that… as an example
of a particularly challenging prize concept, $100
million to $1 billion could be offered to the first

organization to place humans on the Moon and
sustain them for a fixed period before they return
to Earth.”
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Space Based Solar Power Workshop
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
National Security Space Office
Breckenridge, Colorado, September 2007

Preventing resource conflicts in the face of
increasing global populations and demands in the
21st century is a high priority for the United States
(U.S.) Department of Defense (DOD). All
solution options to these challenges should be
explored, including opportunities from space.

alike. It appears that technological challenges are
closing rapidly and the business case for creating
SBSP is improving with each passing year. Still
absent, however, is an appropriate catalyst to
stimulate the various interested parties toward
actually developing SBSP capability.

In March 2007, the National Security Space
Office’s (NSSO) Advanced Concepts Office
presented the idea of space based solar power
(SBSP) as a potential grand opportunity to address
not only energy security, but environmental,
economic, intellectual, and space security as well.
First proposed in the late 1960s, the concept was
last explored in NASA’s 1997 “Fresh Look”
Study. In the decade since this last study,
advances in technology and new challenges to
security have warranted a current exploration of
the strategic implications of SBSP. For these
reasons, NSSO sponsored a no cost Phase 0
Architecture Feasibility Study of SBSP during the
spring and summer of 2007.

Executive Summary

Unlike traditional contracted architecture studies,
the report (executive summary is shown below,
see
http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/
nsso.htm) was compiled through a collaborative
approach that relied upon voluntary internet
discussions by more than 170 academic,
scientific, technical, legal, and business experts
around the world. These discussions were
highlighted in a workshop sponsored by NSSO
and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies.
The results of the workshop led to the
development of an interim assessment that
contains significant initial findings and
recommendations, which provide pause and
consideration for national and international
policy-makers, business leaders, and citizens

Consistent with the U.S. National Security
Strategy, energy and environmental security are
not just problems for America; they are critical
challenges for the entire world. Expanding human
populations and declining natural resources are
potential sources of local and strategic conflict in
the 21st Century, and many see energy scarcity as
the foremost threat to national security. Conflict
prevention is of particular interest to securityproviding institutions such as the U.S. DOD,
which has elevated energy and environmental
security as priority issues with a mandate to
proactively find and create solutions that ensure
U.S. and partner strategic security.
The magnitude of the looming energy and
environmental problems is significant enough to
warrant consideration of all options, to include
revisiting the SBSP concept that was first
invented in the U.S. almost 40 years ago. The
basic idea is very straightforward: place very large
solar arrays into continuously and intensely sunlit
Earth orbit (1,366 watts/m2), collect gigawatts of
electrical energy, electromagnetically beam it to
Earth, and receive it on the surface for use either
as base-load power via direct connection to the
existing electrical grid, conversion into
manufactured synthetic hydrocarbon fuels, or as
low-intensity broadcast power beamed directly to
consumers. A single kilometer-wide band of
geosynchronous Earth orbit experiences enough
solar flux in one year to nearly equal the amount
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of energy contained within all known recoverable
conventional oil reserves on Earth today. This
amount of energy indicates that there is enormous
potential for energy security, economic
development,
improved
environmental
stewardship, advancement of general spacefaring
activities, and overall national security for those
states that construct and possess SBSP capability.
NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy have
collectively spent $80 million over the last three
decades in sporadic efforts studying this concept
(by comparison, the U.S. Government has spent
approximately $21 billion over the last 50 years
continuously pursuing nuclear fusion). The first
major effort occurred in the 1970s where
scientific feasibility of the concept was
established and a reference 5 gigawatt design was
proposed. Unfortunately 1970s architecture and
technology levels could not support an economic
case for development relative to other lower-cost
energy alternatives on the market. In 1995-1997
NASA initiated a “Fresh Look” Study to reexamine the concept relative to modern
technological capabilities. The report (validated
by the National Research Council) indicated that
technology vectors to satisfy SBSP development
were converging quickly and provided
recommended development focus areas, but for
various reasons that again included the relatively
lower cost of other energies, policy-makers
elected not to pursue a development effort.
The post-9/11 situation has changed that calculus
considerably. Oil prices have jumped from $15
per barrel to more than $100 per barrel in less
than a decade. In addition to the emergence of
global concerns over climate change, American
and allied energy source security is now under
threat from actors that seek to destabilize or
control global energy markets as well as increased
energy demand competition by emerging global
economies. Our National Security Strategy
recognizes that many states are too dependent on
foreign oil, often imported from unstable portions
of the world, and seeks to remedy the problem by
accelerating the deployment of clean technologies
to enhance energy security, reduce poverty, and
reduce pollution in a way that will ignite an era of

global growth through free markets and free trade.
Senior U.S. leaders need solutions with strategic
impact that can be delivered in a relevant period
of time.
In March of 2007, the NSSO Advanced Concepts
Office presented this idea to the agency Director.
Recognizing the potential for this concept to
influence not only energy, but also space,
economic, environmental, and national security,
the Director instructed the Advanced Concepts
Office to quickly collect as much information as
possible on the feasibility of this concept. Without
the time or funds to contract for a traditional
architecture study, the Office turned to an
innovative solution: the creation of an open
source, internet-based, interactive collaboration
forum aimed at gathering the world’s SBSP
experts into one particular cyberspace. Discussion
grew immediately and exponentially, such that
there are now 170 active contributors as of the
release of this report (October 2007); this study
approach was an unequivocal success and should
serve as a model for DOD when considering other
study topics.
Study leaders organized discussions into five
groups- (1) a common plenary session; (2) science
and technology; (3) law and policy; (4)
infrastructure and logistics; and (5) the business
case- and challenged the group to answer one
fundamental question: Can the U.S. and partners
enable the development and deployment of a
SBSP system within the first half of the 21st
Century such that if constructed could provide
affordable, clean, safe, reliable, sustainable, and
expandable energy for its consumers? Discussion
results were summarized and presented at a
workshop in Colorado during September 2007
hosted by the U.S. Air Force Academy
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies.
Over the course of the study several overarching
themes emerged:
•

The SBSP Study Group concluded that spacebased solar power does present a strategic
opportunity that could significantly advance
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•

•

•

•

U.S. and partner security, capability, and
freedom of action, and merits significant
further attention on the part of both the U.S.
Government and the private sector.
The SBSP Study Group concluded that while
significant technical challenges remain, spacebased solar power is more technically
executable than ever before, and current
technological vectors promise to further
improve its viability. A government-led proofof-concept demonstration could serve to
catalyze commercial sector development.
The SBSP Study Group concluded that SBSP
requires a coordinated national program with
high-level
leadership
and
resourcing
commensurate with its promise, at least on the
level of fusion energy research or
International Space Station construction and
operations.
The SBSP Study Group concluded that should
the U.S. begin a coordinated national program
to develop SBSP, it should expect to find that
broad interest in SBSP exists outside of the
U.S. Government, ranging from aerospace and
energy industries, to foreign governments,
such as Japan, the European Union, Canada,
India, China, Russia, and others, to many
individual citizens who are increasingly
concerned about the preservation of energy
security and environmental quality. While the
best chances for development are likely to
occur with U.S. Government support, it is
entirely possible that SBSP development may
be independently pursued elsewhere without
U.S. leadership.
Certain key questions about SBSP were not
answerable with adequate precision within the
time and resource limitations of this interim
study, and form the agenda for future action.
The
fundamental
tasks/questions
are:
identification of clear targets for economic
viability in markets of interest; identification
of technical development goals and a roadmap
for retiring risk; selection of the best design
trades; and full design and deployment of a
meaningful demonstrator.

The study group determined four overarching
recommendations:

•

•

•

•

Recommendation #1: The study group
recommends that the U.S. Government should
organize effectively to allow for the
development of SBSP and conclude analyses
to resolve remaining unknowns.
Recommendation #2: The study group
recommends that the U.S. Government should
retire a major portion of the technical risk for
business development.
Recommendation #3: The study group
recommends that the U.S. Government should
create a facilitating policy, regulatory, and
legal environment for the development of
SBSP.
Recommendation #4: The study group
recommends that the U.S. Government should
become an early demonstrator/adopter/
customer of SBSP and incentivize its
development.

Several major challenges will need to be
overcome to make SBSP a reality, including the
creation of low-cost space access and a supporting
infrastructure system on Earth and in space.
Solving these space access and operations
challenges for SBSP will in turn also open space
for a host of other activities that include space
tourism, manufacturing, lunar or asteroid resource
utilization, and eventually settlement to extend the
human race.
Because DOD would not want to own SBSP
satellites, but rather just purchase the delivered
energy as it currently does via traditional
terrestrial utilities, a repeated review finding is
that the commercial sector will need the
government to accomplish three major tasks to
catalyze SBSP development. The first is to retire a
major portion of the early technical risks. This can
be accomplished via an incremental research and
development program that culminates with a
space-borne, proof-of-concept demonstration in
the next decade. A spiral development proposal to
field a 10 megawatt continuous pilot plant en
route to gigawatts-class systems is proposed. The
second challenge is to facilitate the policy,
regulatory, legal, and organizational instruments
that will be necessary to create the partnerships
and
relationships
(commercial-commercial,
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government-commercial,
and
governmentgovernment) needed for this concept to succeed.
The final government contribution is to become a
direct early adopter and to incentivize other early
adopters much as is accomplished on a regular
basis with other renewable energy systems
coming on-line today.
For the DOD specifically, beamed energy from
space in quantities greater than 5 megawatts
electrical has the potential to be a disruptive game
changer on the battlefield. SBSP and its enabling
wireless power transmission technology could
facilitate extremely flexible “energy on demand”
for combat units and installations across an entire
theater, while significantly reducing dependence
on vulnerable over-land fuel deliveries. SBSP
could also enable entirely new force structures
and capabilities, such as ultra long-endurance
airborne or terrestrial surveillance or combat
systems to include the individual soldier himself.
More routinely, SBSP could provide the ability to
deliver rapid and sustainable humanitarian energy
to a disaster area or to a local population
undergoing state-building activities. SBSP could
also facilitate base “islanding” such that each
installation has the ability to operate independent
of vulnerable ground-based energy delivery
infrastructures. In addition to helping American
and allied defense establishments remain relevant
over the entire 21st Century through more secure
supply lines; perhaps, the greatest military benefit
of SBSP is to lessen the chances of conflict due to
energy scarcity by providing access to a
strategically secure energy supply.

follow-on architecture study conducted in full
collaboration with industry and willing
international partners. The purpose of a follow-on
study will be to definitively, rather than
speculatively, answer the question of whether all
of the barriers to SBSP development can be
retired within the next four decades and to create
an actionable business case and construction
effort roadmap that will lead to the installation of
utility-grade SBSP electric power plants.
Considering the development timescales that are
involved, and the exponential growth of
population and resource pressures within that
same strategic period, it is imperative that this
work for “drilling up” versus “drilling down” for
energy security begins immediately.

Despite this early interim review success, there
are still many more questions that must be
answered before a full-scale commercial
development decision can be made. It is proposed
that in the spirit of the original collaborative
SBSP Study Group charter, that this interim report
becomes a living document to collect, summarize,
and recommend on the evolution of SBSP. The
positive indicators observed to surround SBSP by
this review team suggest that it would be in the
U.S. Government’s and the nation’s interest to
sponsor
an
immediate
proof-of-concept
demonstration project and a formally funded,
71

Eisenhower Center Program Annals

Improving Our Vision II: Building Transparency and Cooperation
Workshop on Space Situational Awareness Data Sharing
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information
Secure World Foundation
London, United Kingdom, October 2007

This was the second workshop to bring together a
range of stakeholders to discuss global needs and
capabilities for Space Situational Awareness
(SSA). The first workshop was held in September
2006 in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This 2006
workshop was sponsored by the Eisenhower
Center for Space and Defense Studies and the
World Security Institute’s Center for Defense
Information. The 2006 workshop report can be
found at the following internet site:
http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/SSAConference_screen.
pdf.
The goal of the SSA workshops are to bring
together the full range of stakeholders interested
in SSA– from practitioners to users of data,
representatives of industry, the military, the
scientific community, international organizations,
and the satellite-tracking community– to discuss
how needs are changing, what improvements in
capabilities can be achieved in the near- to midterm future, and how various stakeholder
communities might better interact to draw on each
other’s strengths.
The specific goal of the 2007 SSA workshop was
to explore, and potentially forward, areas of
possible transatlantic cooperation and partnership
to improve SSA data sharing. Space surveillance,
estimating orbits of satellites in near Earth space
for varied purposes, including collaborative
operations, debris management, and more
effective
communication,
environmental
monitoring, and data gathering operations were
emphasized. In addition, the workshop looked at
how informal or formal international regimes
might help underpin or forward improved SSA
data sharing. More than sixty technical experts,
management principals from industry and

government, and respected policy, law, and
international relations luminaries participated.
Participation included, among others, policy
makers and technologists from many countries
and international organizations, including:
Germany, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom,
France, Canada, the United States, the European
Space Agency, and the UN Committee for the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. While many of the
presentations were primarily informational, areas
of consensus during discussions appear to have
emerged around the potential for building
informal processes for international data exchange
that could improve SSA. In addition, all
participants expressed their dedication to ensuring
robust SSA to safeguard current and future space
operations. A full conference report is expected to
be published in 2008, and there is interest in a
follow-on workshop in 2008.
The conference was conducted under a modified
Chatham House Rule, in which prepared
statements and presentations are attributable to
their authors, but comments and opinions
thereafter are not. Presentations are available by
request
at
a
Google
group
site
http://groups.google.com/group/ssa-workshopseries?hl=en.
A summary of the discussions that took place at
the workshop is provided below.
• Phase II of the Commercial and Foreign
Entities (CFE) program was stressed that will
include SSA data sharing on maneuver
notification, debris mitigation, end of life
management, and respect of protected regions.
• French space policy was discussed that
emphasizes freedom of access and security of
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•

•

•

•

•

satellites, while accounting for legitimate
defense interests. This emphasis serves as the
strategic guidelines for European space
collaboration that have been applied for
Galileo and the Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES). The
GRAVES space surveillance radar was also
described. It is operated by the French Air
Force.
It was stated that Germany still relies on the
United States Air Force (USAF) SSA TLE
data. At the same time, Germany’s FGAN and
TIRA space surveillance sensors were
described, and it was suggested that the
European Space Operations Center (ESOC)
located in Germany, which provides satellite
control for the European Space Agency
(ESA), serve as a European SSA center.
The Globus II space surveillance radar,
controlled by the Norwegian Defense
Research Establishment, was offered for SSA
collaboration and sensor calibration.
A number of European workshop participants
declared that Europe must have independent
SSA. It was recognized that SSA data
provided by the U.S. is not exhaustive enough
or responsive enough, yet concomitantly
Europe could not do the job alone. Many
European participants were also adamant of
the European need to validate U.S.
information (i.e., Europe must independently
characterize sources of data), questioning the
credibility of orbit information provided by
the U.S.
The resulting actions to date aimed at an
independent SSA capability in Europe
include: ESA forming a civil-military space
forum and an SSA user group; and European
Cooperation for Space Standardization
(ECSS)
conducting
SSA
technology
development studies. Europe aims to develop
SSA architecture for tracking, imaging, and
space weather. The ESA Management Council
will undertake a data sharing policy. It was
noted that European SSA is an essential
element of European commerce and society
and does not require a business case.
Participants stated that there are clear and
present dangers to space activities that

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

necessitate more robust and enhanced SSA
data sharing. The principal issue is how to
make space activities safer and more secure,
given that weaponization of space was viewed
as a potential obstacle to SSA data sharing.
Analogies were drawn with rules of the road
(codes of conduct) at sea and open skies, and
how such rules fail to apply in space. The key
insight was that rules or codes must be
technically based and that the debate should
not be conducted only from a legal point of
view as is the tendency today.
It was stressed that international standards
serve as one of the best ways for more robust
and enhanced SSA international collaboration.
Of note, is that there is no world wide forum
to distill top-level SSA data requirements.
Although there is uniform agreement on the
need for SSA data sharing, requirements have
not been consolidated.
It was suggested that NATO serve as a vehicle
for combined space capability on SSA.
Ways in which to better integrate orbital
debris and space weather data into SSA data
sharing were discussed. Some ideas included:
real time space weather feeds; and debris
observation campaigns (e.g., each observer
provides his data to the other observers, who
could
independently
combine
the
information).
Space surveillance capability, a range of
sensors, a space catalog, world wide coverage,
ownership of a class of data, services like
collision avoidance, and operational capability
and experience were all viewed as essential
elements of a nation’s space presence.
The USAF TLE process was criticized with
the requisite need of better collaborative
collision avoidance to be put in place.
A number of potential models for SSA data
sharing were discussed. This includes: broad
data exchange approaches; maritime data
sharing in NATO; advancing USAF
approaches; “neighborhood watch” for space
threats as part of a voluntary code of conduct;
space traffic management; and a space safety
organization.
UNCOPUOS was seen as NOT the right place
for SSA initiatives.
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•

Insurance of space activities were viewed as
potentially driving greater diligence with
collision
avoidance,
since
insurance
underwriters recognize the difference between
good and bad space operators.

Ambassador Roger Harrison and Dr. Eligar Sadeh
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies
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